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THE DEVELOPING OPTION MARKET: REGULATORY ISSUES AND
NEW INVESTOR INTEREST*
STEPHEN

F.

GATES*

Of all kinds of speculation none are more interesting than speculating by "Options." If speculation could be conducted by the public in
this way, I do not think it would do much harm. And the exercise of
the mind requisite to work them properly is beneficial rather than not.
Certainly if a man be fond of theory, a good calculator, and desire to
conduct his speculation upon sound principles, without incurring the
practically indefinite risk attaching to most other kinds of speculations,
he should speculate by options."
In the early part of 1972, the Chicago Board Options Exchange was formally
organized 2 after the concept of the new exchange had received initial approval
by the Securities and Exchange Commission in October 1971.3 Trading in
call options on the exchange is to begin on a pilot basis in mid-1973.4 The
establishment of the new exchange will no doubt have a significant impact
on the present structure of put and call trading in the United States, and
the exchange should have tremendous appeal for various investor groups,
especially institutional investors.
This article will first briefly describe the nature of puts and calls and
present a short account of their development in the United States. Next, the
current state of the put and call market will be discussed. Third, the present
regulatory pattern applied to put and call trading will be analyzed.
The Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) will then be discussed,
focusing on the special features that will allow the formulation of new investment strategies. Finally, the legal issues raised in the organization of the
exchange will be analyzed, and the prospects for the successful regulation of
option trading in the future will be discussed.
OprIoNs: TERMINOLOGY AND BAsIc FUNcIIONS

The two basic option forms, "puts" and "calls," give the option holder the
right to sell or buy a specified number of shares of a certain stock at a stated
*A Table of Headings and Subheadings is appended at the end of this article.
OOBA. 1968, Yale University; M.BA. 1972, Harvard Business School; J.D. 1972, Harvard
Law School; 1972-1973, Knox Fellow, London School of Economics; Member of The Florida
Bar.

1. E. PINTO, YE OUTSIDE FOOlS1: GLIMPSES INsm THE LONDON STOrC ExcHANGE 356 (1877).
2. See CCH FE. SEc. L. RP. No. 412, at 7 (1972); Chicago Board Options Exchange,
News Release, Feb. 10, 1972.
3. See Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1971, at 4, col. 4.
4. See BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 27, 1973, at 64.
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price at any time over a specified period. One hundred shares is the usual
size of each put or call, and the option period is generally either 30, 60, or
90 days, 6 months and 10 days, or one year. For example, a put could be a
contract giving the holder the right to sell 100 shares of XYZ Company at
today's price at any time over the next 90 days. Similarly, a call could be a
contract giving the holder the right to buy 100 shares of XYZ Company for
today's price at any time over the next 90 days.
The standard put or call contract is negotiable when duly signed and
endorsed. The endorsement, made by a member firm of the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), guarantees performance on the contract, thus greatly
contributing to the negotiability of the option. The stipulated exercise price
is generally the last price at which the underlying stock traded when the put
or call was purchased 5 and is called the "striking price." The purchaser of
the put or call pays a "premium" to the "writer" of the option who is obligated to perform should the option be exercised. 6
Puts and calls are generally purchased for speculation or insurance.7 A
wide range of possible strategies reflects the fact that puts and calls allow the
investor to restructure the components that characterize common stock ownership. Transactions in puts and calls can facilitate the selling of downside
risk as well as the buying of upside potential. When puts and calls are purchased or sold in combination with common stock, twenty-seven various
risk/reward positions can result. Several positions will be duplications, and
some will reflect no one's preferred position. The essential point, however, is
that the investor can tailor his individual market exposure to his particular
market assessment and risk averseness.
Similar concepts apply to the writers of options, since sellers can manage
risk through various combinations of option writing and stock positions,
usually over a broad portfolio (often functioning essentially as insurance
underwriters). They may view option writing either as a program to augment
portfolio income (writing against established positions) or as ad hoc transactions helpful in establishing or liquidating a stock position.8
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Options have had a long and colorful past, and it is little wonder that
they continue to carry an infamous reputation.9 Although the first recorded

5. The exception is the 30-day option, which always carries a premium of $137.50, and
the variable thus becomes the "points away" from the market at which the striking price is

set.
6. Writers (or sellers) of options are generally institutions or private investors with substantial portfolios, although anyone can write options subject to the house rules of the various
brokerage firms as to minimum account size.
7. For discussions of the traditional uses of options, see J. CUNNION, How To Gs'r
MAXIMUM LEVERAGE FROM PUTS AND CALLS (1966); FILER, ScHMIn'r & Co., 13 WAYS To USE
PUT AND CALL OPTIONS (1969); P. SARNOFF, YOUR INVESTMENTS USING PUTS AND CALLS (1968).

8.
9.

See text accompanying note 172 infra.
For accounts of historical uses of options, see H. FILER, UNDERSTANDING PUT AND CALL
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use of options in the United States dates back to the late eighteenth century,-0
their use did not proliferate until after the Civil War." Puts and calls came
to play a prominent role in the campaigns of various nineteenth-century
stock operators, such as Daniel Drew and Jay Gould. A 1912 story in the
New York American2 describing the option dealing of these two men during

the 1870's reported that:' 3
When [Gould] was conducting his campaign in Union Pacific he sold

probably the largest number of puts that were ever sold on any stock
in Wall Street. He did this to encourage trading in the shares, and at

one time the number of puts he had outstanding was estimated to equal
the total amount of the capital stock of the company.
The article also states that Russell Sage was "the largest seller of puts and
calls that Wall Street has ever known."'14

Throughout this period it was not dear whether options represented valid
contracts or, alternatively, gaming contracts and therefore void under state
gaming laws. Litigation results varied. The financially-oriented states like
New York generally upheld options, especially where a bona fide intention to
deliver on the option existed so that more than a contract "for differences"
(or mere wager) was present.'- The populist midwestern states generally held
options to be void even where an intention to deliver existed.1 6

OPToNs 12 (1959) (Dutch tulip bulb craze); E. MORGAN & W. THOMAS, THa STOCK ExcHANGE
ITS HISTORY AND FUNCTIONS (1969) (early London option trading); Emery, Speculation on the

Stock and Produce Exchanges of the United States, in 7 STUmis IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND
PuBLic LAW 315 (1896) (ancient Greece).
10. J. DAvis, ESSAYS IN TUm EARLm HISTORY OF AmmscAN CORPORATIONS 196 (1917).
11. H. CLrws, TWFNTY-EIGHT YEAS IN WALL STR_ 107-11 (1888).
12. New York American, April 5, 1912, as reproduced in C. GRSTENBERG, MATERIAM ON
CORPORATION FINANCE 444 (5th ed. 1924).
13. Id. at 445.
14. Id. at 446. Russell Sage has elsewhere been credited with fully developing the potential of the straddle. See P. SARuom-, supra note 7, at 15-16. When Sage demanded a 1%
penalty for the extension of a one-month call loan in August 1869, he was charged and
convicted of usury in New York. While his lawyer, Samuel J. Tilden, managed to save Sage
from both the sentence (5 days) and the fine ($500), Sage set about inventing a substitute
transaction to avoid the usury law. He hit upon the "conversion"-a risk-free position of
buying stock and obtaining a put from his customer, simultaneously selling him a call. Any
amount could be charged for the call, since the transaction did not come within the New
York usury law.
15. See, e.g., Harris v. Tumbridge, 83 N.Y. 92 (1880); Story v. Salmon, 71 N.Y. 420 (1877);
Bigelow v. Benedict, 70 N.Y. 202 (1877).
16. See, e.g., Schneider v. Turner, 130 IM. 28 (1889); Rudolf v. Winters, 7 Neb. 125 (1878).
Many of the midwestern cases involved grain option contracts, but the reasoning was analogous to the situation involving securities. "[W]hile the tendency of some of the courts,
notably those of the State of New York, where both the statutory and judicial law is formed
largely in the interest of the speculative element, is to recognize the methods of [option]
trading current on the floors of the Stock and Produce Exchange as part of the law, the
judiciary of other States reject these methods of dealing as against public policy." Eliot,
Exchange By-Laws, in Their Relation to "Option Dealing," 20 Am.L. R.v. 217, 218 (1886).
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Options were recognized by the New York Stock Exchange at this time

7

so that trading could take place on the floor. If an investor were concerned
as to the legality of the contracts, however, or desired dealing in a more
developed market, he could choose to deal in options on the London Stock
Exchange in American issues listed there.' 8
The bull markets of the 1920's spawned a heightened interest in option
trading.19 Options played a central role in various manipulative abuses that
were widespread throughout this period-primarily "pools" through which
large stockholders in a company would give options to pool operators who
would drive up the stock price through the use of misleading reports and
wash sales to generate an aura of activity thereby inducing small investor
purchases. When the operation topped, the large stockholder and pool operator would sell out. 20
Options came under intense attack, and a draft of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 prohibited option trading. 21 This outright prohibition was
averted largely because of the efforts of Herbert Filer who represented the
interests of put and call dealers before Congress. In his testimony he drew
a distinction between private options granted on a large scale for manipulative purposes and guaranteed, competitively-sold options dealt in by put and
call dealers and protected by margin requirements. 22 These distinctions were
accepted. The manipulative devices were prohibited by the statute, 23 and
options were subjected to the rulemaking power of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) .24

17. See New York Stock Exchange, Constitution, art. XXI (1905).
18. A circular of the firm W. & E. Rosenbaum described the procedure and the attractiveness in this operation. It stated: "[T]hese London options ... have in recent years found
very great favor on this side, and many of the most important and largest operators are
frequently purchasing them with the purpose in view, either of making a large profit out
of the "Call" or "Put" itself, or of using them as a protection against their long or short
position in the market, as the case may be." W. & E. Rosenbaum, Puts and Calls, May 12,
1912, as reproduced in C. GERSTENBERG, supra note 12, at 438-40.
19. Options were generally of very short duration during this period-often two or three
days. Herbert Filer, then head of a leading option firm, has described trading in "sevencigar calls"-one day calls selling for $1 worth of cigars. "The idea was to buy one of those
'seven-cigar Calls' and about noon the next day, if the stock had had a run, to sell it for
$25 or more-just for the rest of the day. I saw one of my colleagues make $1,200 on a Call
like that." H. FILER, supra note 9, at 80.
20.

SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGES PRACrCE, S.

1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 37-41, 51-113 (1934). See also TWENTIETH CENTURY
cuRrrY MARuKTs 25, 447, 521 (1935).

FUND,

REP. No.
THE SE-

21. S.2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. §8(a)(9) (1934).
22. See Hearings on S. Res. 84 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 7062-68 (1934). The Twentieth Century Fund Report also drew this distinction. TWENTIETH

CENTURY FUND,

supra note 20, at 447.

23. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §9(a), 15 U.S.C. §78(a) (1970).
24. The Exchange Act, §§9(b), (c), (d) provide:
"(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to effect, by use of any facility of a national
securities exchange, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors-
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In August 1934, the put and call dealers proceeded to establish the Put
25
and Call Brokers and Dealers Association, Inc. with the purposes:
Elle foster the maintenance of high standards of integrity and honor
in all business dealings by its members; to prevent any trade practices
which may be or may tend to be unfair or inequitable; to establish
trade practices which are conducive to harmonious relations among

its members and to efficiency in the conduct of their business, and
thus to enable them to better serve the persons with whom they deal, or
on whose behalf they act; and to provide for the settlement by arbitration of all differences and disputes arising between members, and other-

wise to promote their welfare.
In 1935 the SEC staff proposed rules for the regulation of option trading.
Only the requirement of put and call broker-dealer registration was put into

effect. Most of the other proposals were incorporated into the bylaws of the
Association. 26 By remaining receptive to SEC recommendations, the Association's self-regulation has since been successful in deterring direct federal
regulation. The SEC's rulemaking power under section 9 of the Exchange
Act 27 has never been exercised.
OPTION T.ADum IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY

Since option trading flourishes primarily in rising markets,

8

1969 and

1970 were not record years for option volume. Volume recovered in 1971
with 29,516,000 shares being optioned.29 The shares optioned in 1971 repre-

"(1) any transaction in connection with any security whereby any party to such transaction
acquires any put, call, straddle, or other option or privilege of buying the security from or
selling the security to another person without being bound to do so; or
"(2) any transaction in connection with any security with relation to which he has, directly or indirectly, any interest in any such put, call, straddle, option, or privilege; or
"(3) any transaction in any security for the account of any person who he has reason to
believe has, and who actually has, directly or indirectly, any interest in any such put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege with relation to such security.
"(c) It shall be unlawful for any member of a national securities exchange directly or
indirectly to endorse or guarantee the performance of any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege in relation to any security registered on a national securities exchange, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or ap.
propriatein the public interest or for the protection of investors.
"(d) The terms 'put,' 'call,' 'straddle,' 'option,' or 'privilege' as used in this section shall
not include any registered warrant, right, or convertible security."
15 U.S.C. §§78i(b)-(d) (1970) (emphasis added).
25. Preamble to Ptrr AND CALL BROKERS & DFAERs Ass'N, INC., CONSTIu-ON (1934).
26. SEC REPORT oN PUT AND CALL OPmoNs 100 (1961) [hereinafter cited as SEC Px oRT].
27. 15 US.C. §78i (1970). See, however, note 191 infra.
28. See SEC REPORT, supra note 26, at 21. For an account of the upsurge in option
activity accompanying the 1972 Thanksgiving turnaround in the market, see N.Y. Times,
Feb. 6, 1972, Business & Finance Section, at 2, col. 1 (city ed.).
29. Letter from Murrey E. Gottesman, President, Put and Call Brokers & Dealers Ass'n,
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sent 295,160 option contracts. Therefore only about 1,180 options are traded
per trading day on all stocks. The present market obviously suffers a
thinness that sometimes prevents the actual accomplishment of good theoretical investment strategies.
The precise makeup of the option market can be ascertained only through
a careful gathering of statistics. The SEC's Report on Put and Call Optionso
analyzing option activity during the month of June 1959 is the only such
investigation. The most interesting findings will be mentioned. It must be
noted first, however, that the composition of the option market at any point
in time is largely a function of the current stock market conditions and outlook. June 1959 proved to be close to the crest of a twenty-month market
rise.31 Second, the option market has changed both quantitatively and qualitatively in the ensuing thirteen years. Volume has increased from 8.8 million
shares optioned to 29.5 million. The probable qualitative changes will be
pointed out herein, although another statistical survey would be required to
determine precise changes.
Market Structure and Trading Practices
In 1961 about fifteen of the twenty-eight members of the Put and Call
Brokers and Dealers Association were active market participants. 2 Of the
twenty-six current members, about twenty are active. None of these firms is
33
publicly held so detailed information as to their activities is not available.
The bulk of all option transactions go through these active option dealers
who act as a clearing house for the option departments of retail brokerage
houses. Occasionally these dealers handle transactions directly for established
clients, finding buyers to match with their writing clients, and sellers to match
with their purchasing clients. The smaller dealers rarely write options or
otherwise deal for their own accounts, but the larger firms do trade in options,
34
carrying an inventory of "special options."
The brokerage house with a customer wishing to buy or sell an option
will normally canvass six to eight of the option dealers, shopping for the best
premium available. When one is found acceptable to the customer, a transaction is completed. The process may take anywhere from twenty minutes
(for a regularly optioned stock) to two days. The mechanics then involve
payment by the buyer of the premium in cash, and deliverance by the dealer
of the option contract to the seller's brokerage firm for endorsement, 5 along

to Stephen F. Gates, March 13, 1972. About 2,000 different issues are optioned with only
about 800 on a regular basis. Pacey, Option Pick-Up, Barron's, Sept. 22, 1969, at 11.
30. SEC REPoRT, supra note 26.
31. For a list of studies in different market types, see note 56 infra.
32. SEC REPORT, supra note 26, at 63.
33. The option firm, Lawrence Kotkin Associates, Inc., did go public in June 1969. See
Pacey, supra note 29, at 11. However, the firm was subsequently acquired by Philips, Appel
& Walden, Inc. N. Y. Times, supra note 28.
34. See text accompanying notes 37-38 infra.

35. This is required by the rules of the Put and Call Brokers &Dealers Ass'n.
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with a check for the premium to go to the seller and a check for the brokerage
firm's endorsement fee. The endorsement fee is normally paid out of the
option dealer's spread, since he realizes about $62.50 in buying from the seller
and selling to the buyer.36 The brokerage firm is not uneager to endorse the
contract as it represents potential stock brokerage commissions if exercised.
Premiums vary considerably, and depend principally upon the volatility
of the underlying stock price, the length of the option, the market in which
the stock is traded, and the price range of the stock. The highest premiums
are found, understandably enough, for long options on active, low priced
over-the-counter issues. Premiums of 35 per cent and higher do occur although
premiums are generally in the 10-15 per cent range for a six-month and tenday call on a less volatile medium-priced issue. Puts are somewhat less expensive, primarily as a function of supply and demand. Many option writers
favor straddles, thus generating both a put and call, while buyers are more
interested in calls (for the same reason that most investors will not sell short) .
The imbalance results in cheaper puts and in the brokerage house "conversion" function whereby puts are converted into calls-by buying the put,
purchasing the underlying stock, and selling a call. This establishes a risk-free
position for the converter, and for this service he charges two floor commissions and 1 to 3 per cent above the call rate, depending upon the demand
37
for conversions.
The larger option dealers buy options thought to be in high demand and
inventory them. It is these contracts that appear in newspaper ads as "special
puts" or "special calls." Firm prices can be quoted on these options, which
tend to be at a striking price somewhat away from the current market. Few
of the total number of options are sold this way, and the advertised ones
tend to be attractively priced to generate buyer interest.
This system perpetuates high transaction costs and chronic lack of liquidity
-the two major defects of the present market. There is almost no interest
in buying existing options, since a new option ("market papers") is written
in almost every case. Profitable options therefore generate little resale value
above their "in the money" value, and option dealers do not make a secondary
market in existing puts and calls. Thus, when holding a profitable option, an
investor can only reap its benefit by exercising it. Brokers will repurchase
options at their "in the money" value, less two commissions, as a service to
customers in avoiding margin reqirements upon exercise or to establish a
long-term capital gain if the option were held over six months. Also, unprofitable options will be repurchased for one dollar to establish a short-term
capital loss for the customer. Furthermore, the option writer cannot escape
his obligation to deliver or purchase if the option is exercised. Should his
circumstances or market assessment change, he can only execute additional
market transactions to alter his exposure. He currently is unable to liquidate
his option position.
THE PROFrTABILTY OF STOcK OPTioNs 73 (1970).
37. Twenty-four brokerages were active in converting in 1961. See SEC
note 26, at 61. The number is no doubt much greater today.

36. See K. ZEIG,
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The bulk of option activity relates to common stocks. However, other
types of securities are increasingly being optioned. The SEC Report found
that in June 1959 there were outstanding options on 894 common stocks,
6 preferred stocks, 6 convertible preferred stocks, 38 9 warrants, 39 and 4 bonds."
Fifty stocks accounted for 421 of the outstanding options. 41 The market is
no doubt wider now, but seems to be only a little deeper.
The Report also disclosed an almost complete lack of institutional involvement in the option market at the time. Foreign and domestic individuals
wrote over 85 per cent of all options. Fourteen NYSE member firms wrote
options for their own accounts. 42 That number is without doubt greater
today.4 3 Also without doubt is the marked increase in the degree of institutional involvement that has occurred. Many articles have recently appeared
describing the benefits of institutional option writing a4 and mutual funds
now often stipulate option writing as a possible activity. With the continuing
education of money managers and improvement in the market, institutional
interest should accelerate.
One obstacle to greater institutional participation is the current thinness
and disorderliness of the option market. Whereas trades generally run in
one to five (or even up to ten) options in an active issue, institutions would
be more interested in placing on the order of 50 or more options (or 5,000
shares or more) at a time. The lack of firm bids, the widely scattered "indications" quoted
by various dealers, and the wait for execution deter many
4
institutions.

5

38.

For a quasi-arbitrage strategy employing options on convertible preferred stock, see
29-46 (1959).
39. For a strategy using options on warrants, see P. SARNOFF, supra note 5, at 153-58.
40. SEC REPORT, supra note 26, at 29. It is interesting to note that it is currently possible
to trade in options on commodity futures contracts. The bulk of such trading is done in
London. See WOODHOUSE, DRAKE & CAREY, INC., COMMODITY OPTIONS (1971). Puts and calls
on commodity futures contracts are available in the United States.
41. SEC REPORT, supra note 26, at 29.
42. Id. at 56.
43. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., for example, has been an active writer of calls
in recent years. "The Company sells call options for its own clients' accounts. Call bids are
received from put and call brokers and directly from institutional buyers. The Company will
then purchase the stock and sell the call. All premiums paid by the buyer of calls are credited to the account selling the call option and that account may incur loss should the stock
decline before the call is exercised or expires. For client accounts, the Company is compensated only by Commissions for buying and selling the underlying stock. The amount of DLJ
capital committed to option activities on December 31, 1969, was $1.7 million." Donaldson,
Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., Prospectus, April 9, 1970, at 13. During 1969 the firm collected
$1,123,735 in option premiums. If the amount of capital committed to call writing at year
end was representative of the entire year, the premiums represent a return of 66%.
44. See, e.g., Franklin & Colberg, Puts and Calls: A Factual Survey, 13 J. FINANCE 21
(1958); Liberman, Option Selling: Challenge Opportunity, and Hazards, COMMERCIAL &
FINANCIAL CRONICLE, Feb. 22, 1962, at 14; Malkiel & Quandt, Can Options Improve an Institution's Performance?, INITITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov. 1968, at 55; Hows and Whys of Put
and Call Underwriting,FORBES, Dec. 15, 1961, at 20.
45. See ROBERT R. NATHAN AssociAT-s, INC., PUBLIC POLICY AsPEcrS OF A FUTuREs-TYPE
R. WHITING, PROFITABLE TRADING WITH PUTS AND CALLS
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Furthermore, tax exempt institutions may be cautious, since premiums
on unexercised options are ordinary income 8 and appear taxable to tax
exempt institutions as "unrelated business income" for the purposes of section
412 of the Internal Revenue Code 7 Recent legislative change has assured
capital treatment for the writing of straddles. Gains on the lapse of an option
written as part of a straddle are deemed to be short-term capital gains.4 The
Internal Revenue Service, however, has taken the position that if neither
side of the straddle is exercised, the entire premium constitutes ordinary
income.4 9 The tax law thus continues to deter option writing by tax exempt
institutions and investment companies. For others, however, the tax treatment for both buyers and sellers is very favorable. 50
The SEC Report was only able to identify the buyers from put and call
dealers, 80 per cent of whom were NYSE member firms buying for customers'
accounts. The ultimate purchasers remained unknown. Interviews with the
firms indicated that except for one or two banks there were no institutional
buyers of options. 1 Mutual funds were not mentioned as buyers. The bulk
of all purchases were therefore by individual investors.
This situation has probably changed significantly since the SEC Report.
82
Hedge funds especially have been active purchasers in the option market.
Mutual funds, closed-end investment companies, and private pension funds
should become more active buyers in the future.8 5 These institutions would
probably not be pursuing the sheer speculative uses as with hedge funds.
While banks, insurance companies, and public pension funds might have
occasion to desire to buy options, their power to do so may be limited by
state legal investment statutes 54 Their power to sell options is not so impaired.

MARKEr IN OPTIONS ON SEcuRrris 14 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
was prepared for the Chicago Board of Trade].
46.

INT. REv.

CODE

NATHAN REPORT]

[this report

of 1954, §1234(a).

47. Rev. Rul. 66-47, 1966-1 Cum. BuLL. 149. Such premiums may also constitute 'noninvestment income" and jeopardize the status of regulated investment companies under
§851(6)(2).
48.

INT. REV.

CODE

Of 1954,

§1234(c).

49. Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.1234-2(a), 33 Fed. Reg. 14236 (1968).
50. A presentation of the tax treatment of puts and calls is beyond the scope of this
article. See generally J. CUNNION, TAXEs, PUTS AND CALLs (1962); Colgan, Puts, Calls, and
Other Options, N.Y.U. 27TH INsT. ON FED. TAX. 1157 (1969); Hariton, Puts, Calls and
Straddles, N.Y.U. 18TH INsT. ON FED. TAX. 357 (1960).
51. SEC REPORT, supra note 26, at 75.

52. The use of puts and calls in the managing of hedge funds and the possibility of an
option fund are discussed in C. THOMAS, HEmGEMANSHIP: How To MAKE MONEY IN BEAR
MARKETS, BULL MARKErs, AND CHicKEN MARKERS WHILE CONFOUNDING PROFESSIONAL MONEY

109 (1970).
53. Possible reasons for institutional purchases of option are discussed in text following
note 172 infra.
54. E.g., options would come within the unrestricted category of legal investments for
insurance companies, limited to 3%,l%of admitted assets in New York. N.Y. INs. LAw
§81(17) (McKinney 1966). The limit is 5% in Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 73, §737.22a
(Smith-Hurd 1965). In some states purchases of options may not be permitted at all. See, e.g.,
TEE. INS. CODE art. 2.10 (Vernon 1963).
MANAGERS AND ATTRAcING A BE=rER CLAss OF WOMEN
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With the increasing number of books and articles in circulation explaining
the advantages of option buying,55 interest should be growing on the demand
side of the market also.
The Profitability of Option Trading
Obviously the appeal of option activity will be a function of the returns
that can be expected from participating in the market. Over the past sixteen
years, six studies of the profitability of options have appeared. 56 The results
of the studies have been inconsistent and depend upon the particular assumptions, methodology, and time period that characterized each analysis.
Over-all the studies demonstrate the desirability of money managers being
fully familiar with option techniques and being willing to utilize both purchases and sales of options when appropriate to a particular strategy. One
study highlighted the importance of tax status and risk aversion for the
selection of option strategies.5 Another verified the critical factor of market
timing.58 Together the studies indicate the paramount importance for option
purchasers of selecting stocks for which a price movement (up or down) of
sizeable magnitude is expected over a specific period of time. A keen appreciation of direction, magnitude, and timing is essential. Options can in no
way make up for a basic lack of market judgment.
Recent Developments
Several attempts have been made and are in progress to improve the functioning of the option market. Individual and institutional interest can only
be heightened by steps taken to lower transaction costs, improve liquidity,
and broaden the market. Many brokerage firms have recently established or
upgraded option departments to service the growing interest. The recently
formed Association of Member Firm Option Departments now has over
forty-five members. The growth of option activity within a particular brokerage firm increases its opportunity to "cross" options between customers. 59
Another new feature is the "private placement" of options between brokerage firms and institutional investors. These generally take the form either of

55. See, e.g., J.
56.
AND

CUNNION,

supra note 7; H. FILER, supra note 9; Pacey, supra note 29.

See, e.g., SEC REPORT, supra note 26, at 79; B. MALKIEL & R. QUANIr, STRATEGIES

RATIONAL

DECISIONS IN

THE SECURITIES

OPTIONS

MARKET

(1969); K. ZiEG,

THE

PROFIT-

ABILITY OF STOCK OPTIONS (1970); Boness, Some Evidence of the Profitability of Trading
in Put and Call Options, in THE RANDOM CHARACTER OF STOCK MARKEr PRICES 475

(P. Cootner ed. 1964); Kruizenga, Profit Return from Purchasing Puts and Calls, in TR
RANDOM CHARACTER OF STOCK MARKEr PRICES 392 (P. Cootner ed. 1964); Katz, Profitability
of Put and Call Option Writing, 5 INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT
57. B. MALKIEL & R. QUANDT, supra note 56.

REV.

55 (1963).

58. K. Zm, supra note 56.
59. See, e.g., MERRILL, LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., GUIDE To BuYING PUTS AND
CALLS 6 (1971). Reynolds & Co. reports that 25% of its option business is in-house. FORTUNE,
Nov. 1971, at 211.
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specially negotiated options tailored to the institution's needs or so-called
"expiration price option" also called "up-side out" puts and "down-side out"
calls. These are options written to expire at the earlier of the expiration date
stated or such time as the price of the underlying stock trades at a stipulated
"expiration price." Usually the expiration price for calls is set 10 per cent
below the striking price (current market price), and the expiration price for
puts is 10 per cent above the striking price.
Expiration price options offer three advantages to option writers. 60 Risk
is lessened due to the expiration of the contract upon a market move against
the buyer. Use of margin in his underlying stock positions may therefore be
more desirable. Also, option expiration on a move against the buyer will
allow the writer to turn over his capital more often without continued exposure. Finally, the writer's lower risk means lower premiums and greater
leverage for the buyer.0Another attempt to improve the present market is being made by Market
Monitor Date, Inc., a computerized system designed to give subscribers current
striking price and premium information. 2 The system does not appear to be
making great headway, however, in broadening the market.63
The primary activity now among brokerage and option houses is seeking
institutional business. Options ads now indicate those issues in which options
are available in volume. United States Option Corporation is a leader in the
block business and on transactions of over 30 options has replaced the dealer's
spread with a commission schedule. 64 Eventually dealers may see firmer
markets on both sides, thus reducing current concern over whether an inquiry
is from a buyer or seller.
The latest development, and one with the greatest potential for improving
the option market, is the establishment of the Chicago Board Options Ex65
change.
Market Shortcomings
The option market remains a fractured market place suffering from several
ailments. The principal problems are as follows:
60. See generally, Snyder, Alternative Forms of Options, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS' J. Sept.Oct. 1969, at 93-99.
61. The SEC has indicated that when issuing "expiration price options" the writer must
make meaningful disclosure designed to inform the purchaser of the special risks involved.
This might include drawing the purchaser's attention to recent fluctuation in the underlying
stock price. Also in order to avoid violations of anti-fraud provisions, the brokerage house
must be careful not to trigger the expiration price in other transactions. See CCH FED. SEc.
L. REP. 978,159 (interpretive letter In re Goldman, Sachs & Co., April 22, 1971).
62. Pacey, supra note 29, at 19.
63. The system has been criticized for not offering any bids, just offers. It seems there
is a reluctance to divulge bids, however, in order to get them into the system. Id.
64. Le., the option seller receives the entire premium less the commission, and the buyer
pays the same premium plus a commission. The commission varies from $12.50 to $37.50 per
option depending on the size of the premium. Id. at 20.
65. See text accompanying notes 167-169 infra.
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(1). high transaction costs due to the dealers' spread of approximately fifty dollars on an average option and the necessity of paying
two brokerage commissions upon exercise or resale of the option;
(2). lack of liquidity and breadth making it difficult for the few
currently active institutions to buy or sell what they want in the
volume they want;
(3). lack of secondary market making it difficult to liquidate a
position; and
(4). chronic lack of market information and lack of widespread
understanding of the uses of options even among professional money
managers.
THE PRESENT REGULATION OF THE OPTION

MARKET

While the SEC has never exercised its rulemaking power, 66 it has closely
followed put and call trading through regular weekly reports from the Put
and Call Brokers and Dealers Association. In addition the Commission has
issued reports on the option market in 1935, 1939, 1944, and 1945 as well as
its extensive report in 1961. As noted earlier, the rule proposals of 1935 were
67
largely incorporated in the Constitution and Bylaws of the Association.
The 1961 report was the outgrowth of the SEC's concern over the "growing
interest in a potentially highly speculative field." 68 The SEC subsequently
expressed the view that: 69
[P]ut and call option contracts are securities of a most complicated and
technical kind whose many intricacies and complex nature are not
fully understood even by many persons engaged in the securities business itself, much less by the average or unsophisticated investor. Transactions involving puts and calls have substantial speculative aspects
and entail significant risks of loss, and dealings in them are highly
specialized and difficult.
The scope of the SEC's rulemaking power is not clear. Section 9 (b)
proscribes transactions made in violation of SEC rules by use of any facility
of a national securities exchange. Section 9 (c) permits the SEC to regulate
option endorsement by stock exchange member firms. The Commission, then,
does not appear to have the power under section 9 to ban options, as has
been suggested.70 In its rulemaking power under section 16 (e) of the Exchange
Act, 71 the SEC has effectively banned arbitrage activities by officers and directors; 72 however, that section was not qualified by language similar to that in
66. 15 U.S.C. §78i(b)-(c) (1970).
67. Thus, the option market continues under close scrutiny, and many of the provisions
of the Put and Call Brokers & Dealers Ass'n regulating members' conduct are the result of
joint conferences with the SEC. SEC REPORT, supra note 26, at 100. The Association's bylaws
were recently being revised. Letter, supra note 29.
68.

SEC REPoRT, supra note 26, at 2.

69.
70.
71.
72.

SEC Investment Advisory Act Release No. 228, at 4 (Aug. 30, 1958).
See Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422, 425 (2d Cir. 1962).
15 U.S.C. §78p(e) (1970).
See SEC Rule 16c-1, 17 C.F.R. §240.16c-1 (1971).
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section 9 (b). A prohibition of option endorsements by member firms under
section 9 (c) would certainly detract from the negotiability of options, but a
market might effectively survive based on an alternative endorsement system.
For those options not requiring the facilities of a national securities exchange for execution, or member firm endorsement for acceptance, the SEC
would have to resort to a strained application of its rulemaking power under
section 15 (c) (2)73 to ban over-the-counter (OTC) options (as a "fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative practice")74 should it ever so desire-and query
whether the Commission's specific section 9 power would limit the degree
to which it might find the power even under section 15 (c) (2).
Aside from the SEC's rulemaking power, several other provisions, of the
federal securities laws have major significance for the option market.
Margin Requirements
Pursuant to section 7 (c) of the Exchange Act, T8 the Federal Reserve
Board's Regulation T71 governs credit extensions by brokers and dealers for
the purchase of securities. Since section 7 (a) 77 gives the Board the authority
to prescribe margin requirements on any "security," the Board has evidently
concluded that option contracts constitute "securities."78 "Contracts involving
an endorsement or guarantee of any put, call, or other option" are made an
exception to the exception from inclusion in a customer's general account. 79
Thus, the customer must make his option transactions in a margin account.
The purchaser of an option must put up cash, for under Regulation T
options have no loan value-being neither "exempted securities" nor "margin
equity securities."110 Although an option may be an "equity security,"81 it
does not meet the definition of a "margin security" as "any registered security
or OTC margin stock,"s 2 since presently options are not registered on a
national security exchange or included in the Board's list of OTC margin
stocks.
Having paid cash for the full purchase price of his option, the option
holder may face margin requirements when he wishes to exercise it. In the

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

15 U.S.C. §78o(c)(2) (1970).
Securities Exchange Act §15(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. §78a(c)(10) (1970).
15 U.S.C. §78g(c) (1970).
Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. §220 (1971).
15 U.S.C. §78g(a) (1970).

78. See text accompanying notes 101-105 infra for a discussion of the status of options as
"securities." For purposes of the margin regulations the Federal Reserve Board staff would
probably recommend that "securities" be interpreted to include puts and calls. Letter from
S. A. Schoedel, Attorney, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to Stephen F.
Gates, March 23, 1972.
79. Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. §220.3(a) (1971).
80. Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. §220.3(c)(2) (1971).
81. Regulation T's definition of "equity security" is that in §(a)(11) of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(ll) (1970).
82. Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. §220-2(f) (1971).
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case of a put, the stock would first have to be purchased in order to exercise
the option. In the case of a call, the stock would be received upon exercise.
In either case, the appropriate margin would have to be put up for the purchase involved. Since the position would generally be liquidated the same day,
the day trade margin rules would apply.8 3 Brokers would, however, eliminate
this margin requirement by purchasing profitable options at their "in the
money" value less a buy and sell brokerage commission.84 This procedure has
recently been formalized by a NYSE interpretation of its rule 431 stating
that profitable options may be sold or exercised and the position simultaneously liquidated without meeting the margin requirements of rule 431.85
This interpretation was made "in recognition of the risk-free nature of those
transactions to terminate options which by their nature during their life have
been highly speculative." 8
On the other hand, if the call holder wishes to hold the stock received
upon exercise for longer term investment, the margin requirement will be
calculated on the purchase price of the stock (striking price of the call)
while the loan value of the stock will be figured on its current market price.
This benefit would depend somewhat on the balance of the customer's
87
account.
The necessity for the option seller to conduct transactions on a margin
account is understandable, since the endorser must be in a position to satisfy
the exercise of the option without awaiting the customer's specific permission.
NYSE rule 431 (d) (2) provides that the issuance or guarantee of an option
is a "security transaction" for purposes of the margin requirements and that
puts and calls are to be margined as if they were exercised. This applies only
to writing "naked" options, since covered options need no additional margin
if the underlying stock position is adequately margined. Thus, writing a
naked call requires a minimum 30 per cent margin 8 and writing a naked
put requires a 25 per cent margin. 9 Writing a naked straddle requires only
the higher of the two. It should be noted, however, that while the writer is
putting up a 25-30 per cent margin, he is receiving in cash a premium of 8-15
per cent for the option. Also these are minimum margin requirements, and
it is not uncommon for particular brokerage houses to require more.
Violation of margin requirements in connection with put and call writing
was the subject of the recent case of Bowman v. Hartig.90 In Bowman the
plaintiff allegedly suffered considerable losses due to excessive credit extensions

83. "Excessive day traders" must deposit the normal margin requirement. Active option
traders could come within this exchange rule.
84. One option market authority indicates that these commissions can be saved if the
options are held by the customer and sold directly through an option dealer rather than
through a brokerage house. See P. SARNOFF, supra note 7,at 121.
85. See CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. No. 413, at 10 (1972).
86. Id.
87. See MarL, LYNCH, PiERcE, FENNER & SMrrH, INC., supra note 59, at 9-10.
88. NYSE Rule 431(b)(3).
89. NYSE Rule 431(b)(1).
90. 334 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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in an option writing account. The plaintiff's allegation of credit extensions in
excess of the limits prescribed by sections 8 (a) and (c) of the Exchange Act,
and of failure to liquidate plaintiff's account after seizure as required by
Regulation T, were held to state a cause of action upon which relief could
be granted.91
With the rising volume in the put and call market and the cult of performance that has developed among institutional investors, especially hedge
funds, option "arrangements" that have been found, or may be found, to
violate the margin rules have blossomed. This springs from the fact that
various option types and the variables within an option contract can be
manipulated to approximate (at low effective margins) various stock positions.
The recent "deep in the money" put and call options interpretation of the
92
Federal Reserve Board presents such a case.
The Boston brokerage firm of Gordon &cCo. had devised a scheme that
proved attractive to investors seeking high leverage. Their promotional material indicated that: 93
As margin requirements keep rising, leverage of available funds becomes
increasingly difficult.
Gordon has devised a new concept which enables hedge funds, large
investors, traders and similarly oriented groups- to aggressively and effectively take an immediate, in depth, long or short position in securities with
considerable leverage of funds at a reasonable cost....
For less than $330,000.00 one can control approximately $1,000,000.00
of securities.
The device consisted of Gordon's writing, for example, a 30-day call on 100
dollar stock with a striking price of $70-and simultaneonsly buying the stock
at 100 dollars. The premium charged would be $3,250, that is $3,000 "in the
money" value plus $250 for the option value. The option would be renewable with price adjustments for additional 30-day periods at $150 per renewal.
With such a short option period and "deep in the money" striking price, it
would seem almost certain to be exercised. Thus, the purchaser has in effect
bought the stock on a 30 per cent margin. Although the option seller would
be adequately margined in his purchase of the stock, the Federal Reserve
Board determined that the option seller would be acting as a broker to the

91. Id. at 1326. The court expressed some concern over the current state of margin liabilities, saying: "By now 'the small speculator' [whom the margin requirements were in
part designed to protect] may indeed be the wolf of Wall Street in sheep's clothing. Yet, he
enjoys a paternalistic protection if his stockbroker chances to lend him more than he is
allowed to for the purchase or carrying of securities. If damage comes from such foolish
speculation born of excessive credit, it is the broker who must pay the piper to indicate the
purposes of the statutory controls." Id. at 1327. In this case the plaintiffs alleged no knowledge of the margin violations.
92. 12 C.F.R. §220.122 (1971). The ruling has been appealed. See Gordon & Co. v. Board
of Governors, 317 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Mass. 1970).
93. Memorandum of Gordon & Co., Inc., quoted in Lipton, Some Recent Innovations To
Avoid the Margin Regulations, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 14 n.54 (1971).
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buyer and that an extension of credit was involvedY Thus, the writing of
such contracts is prohibited. 95
A technique that employs a combination of option types rather than a
planned arrangement of option terms is also available and involves a "conversion" transaction. An investor can sell a put that a brokerage firm converts
into a call by buying the put, purchasing the stock, and selling a call. The
investor then buys the call. The market position of simultaneously selling a
put and buying a call approximates that of a long position in the stock. The
put premium received almost covers the call premium paid, and the margin
on writing the put is only 25 per cent compared to the present 65 per cent on
purchasing the stocks directly. This device also appears to be a violation of
the spirit of the margin rules if not the letter, although it has not been so
held. 96
The device certainly becomes more attractive as the margin requirements
rise. The only "cost" of the additional leverage is the excess of the price of
the call over the premium received on the put. As the option market broadens
to include more regular offerings of options on OTC stocks, the device offers
a means of obtaining margin purchases of currently unmarginable securities.
If the two parts of the transaction were carried out through separate brokers
or through separate transactions at one firm, it is difficult to see just where a
broker margin violation would lie-although the end position appears to be
illegally margined. The new Regulation X 97 may be applicable here.
Regulation X provides that: "A borrower shall not obtain any purpose
credit from within the United States unless he does so in compliance with
the following conditions: . . . (2) credit obtained from a broker/dealer shall
conform to the provisions of Part 220 ... (Regulation T) ."98

The purpose of Regulation X is declared to be: 99
[-]o prevent the infusion of unregulated credit obtained both outside
and within the United States into U.S. securities markets in circumvention of the provisions of the Board's margin regulations or by
borrowers falsely certifying the purpose of a loan or otherwise wilfully
and intentionally evading the provisions of those regulations.

94. For this interpretation it was not necessary for the Board to determine that the call
option involved was a "security," since the certainty of exercise made the option in effect
the purchase of the underlying stock on 30% margin.
95. The attractiveness of the arrangement to Gordon & Co. is obvious. Gordon buys the
stock using the $3,000 from the purchaser and $7,000 of its own. At transaction costs of about
$100, Gordon has a $150 ($250-$100) return on its $7,000 investment in 30 days-or 25.8%
per annum.
96. See Lipton, supra note 93, at 15.
97. Reg. X, 12 C.F.R. §224 (1972) (effective Nov. 1, 1971).
98. Reg. X, 12 C.F.R. §224.2 (1972).
99. Reg. X, 12 C.F.R. §224.1 (1972) (emphasis added). Regulation X exempts innocent
error, §224.6(a), and specifically covers aiders and abettors, §224.6(b).
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Although the policy of the regulation appears to encompass the prohibition
of devices such as the "sell put/buy call," the borrower does not come into
violation unless his broker is not in compliance with Regulation T. However,
with two accounts, no broker violation seems to occur. Schemes like this may
make it necessary to extend the borrower's liability for excessive margin
violations apart from broker violations.
In light of the accelerating interest in and awareness of option trading,
it seems likely that numerous other schemes may emerge, especially if the
margin requirement is raised. The "deep in the money put and call options"
interpretations, however, as well as other recent margin actions, 100 indicate
the resolve of the Federal Reserve Board to expand the coverage of the margin
rules and to dose loopholes that appear violative of the purpose of the
provisions.
The Status of Puts and Calls as "Securities"

Much of the significance of the federal securities law for puts and calls
depends upon their coming within the definition of "security" in both section
102
2 (1) of the Securities Act 01 and section 3 (a) (10) of the Exchange Act.
The definitions are essentially the same for this purpose.
The reference in the section 2 definition to a "right to purchase" a security
would easily seem to cover the call option. The definition, however, does not
comprehend a "right to sell" thus making the inclusion of puts not as obvious.
The recent history of option trading, the tenor of investment literature, and
the general attitudes of investors certainly provides a foundation for classifying puts as "instruments commonly known as" securities.l0
The issue appears not to have arisen often, since no judicial authority
exists. Two SEC proceedings support the inclusion of options.1 04 Although
the SEC takes the position that calls constitute "securities,"1 5 this again leaves

open the question of puts. It would be a surprising result, however, to treat
the two option types differently when it appears not too difficult or strained

100. See, e.g., the Federal Reserve Board ruling on security purchase joint ventures,
12 CXF.R. §220.121 (1971); and on installment purchase of tax shelters, Wall St. J., March 27,
1972, at 26, col. 2. See also the SEC action in SEC v.Madison Square Garden Corp., CCH
Fed. Sec. Rep. 92,649 (consent decree).
101. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act provides: "When used in this title, unless the
context otherwise requires-(1) the term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security,' or
any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt
for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing."
15 U.S.C. §77b(l) (1970).
102. 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(10) (1970).
103. See L. Loss, Srcuarrms REruLArxoN 469 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited

as Loss].
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., SEC interpretive letter In re Dean Witter & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
178,602 (1971).
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to fit both within the definition. Once puts were included, straddles would
follow.
Registration of Options
The SEC has never required the registration of puts and calls' 0 6 The
SEC's present position was made clear in a recently issued interpretive
letter,10 7 the result of a request by Dean Witter & Co. for approval by the
California Commissioner of Insurance of its proposal to assist several California insurance companies in writing calls on stocks in their portfolios. The
position of the SEC staff, that registration was required, was made known
to the Commissioner who then declined to approve the call writing proposal.
Dean Witter & Co. then sought to obtain a no-action letter until the SEC
either adopted a registration form for calls or enforced registration against
all sales of call options. The firm also asked that the Commission consider the
matter.
The Commission agreed with the position of the SEC staff that registration
is required absent an exemption. The no-action letter was denied, and
although a new registration form has not been formulated, the SEC staff has
stated that it is available to discuss the types of disclosure that should be
made in registering calls on current forms.
Although this development does not represent a change in SEC policy
and there is no indication that registration of calls will be enforced, it will
be helpful at this point to discuss the nature of options as "securities." These
instruments obviously relate to an underlying security in which the investor's
principal interest lies. Thus, the success of an investment in options lies
totally in the performance of another security. The "issuer" of the option will
normally have no influence on the outcome of the investment.
What kind of information would the investor need to know in order to
make an informed purchase of a put or call? The decision to buy a call is
similar to the decision to buy the underlying stock-with the added judgment
as to the magnitude and timing of the expected price rise. The substitution
of an option for speculative purposes is merely an attempt to maximize
potential return through leverage or to limit loss on the position. Alternatively,
a purchase may be for insurance purposes in relation to an existing position in
the underlying stock. For the latter, the additional information need is rather
small. The purchaser need only understand his transaction.
For the speculative or loss limiting option purchase, the primary information need relates to the underlying stock and the company it is in. The

106.

This is no doubt due to the "practical difficulties of applying §5 to instruments so

created and traded." See Loss, supra note 103, at 468.
107. See SEC interpretive letter, supra note 105. The recently issued proposed rule 238
under the Securities Act would exempt options from registration if certain conditions are
met as to the security being optioned, the gross proceeds of the sale, and the identity of
the writer and endorser. See SEC Sec. Act Release No. 5366 (Feb. 8, 1973).
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issuer (writer) of the option is not in a practical position to supply such
information. As an outsider, only published sources could be consulted and
their accuracy could not be verified. Thus, it is not dear just what benefit
might flow from the registration of options or what information the issuer
should be required to provide.
As to the option issuer, the purchaser would be most interested in his
ability to meet his contractual obligations upon exercise. This concern is
diminished or at least transferred, since the contract is guaranteed by a NYSE
member firm. While the financial condition of some brokerage houses may
lead the purchaser to desire financial data as to the endorser, generally it is
doubtful that the option purchaser has a deep concern over the financial
position of the writer. In almost every case the buyer is unaware of the source
of his option.
Another possible concern of the option purchaser is with the factor primarily contributing to the success of his option, that is, price movements in
the underlying stock. The SEC has indicated that price volatility should
perhaps be part of the meaningful disclosure necessary in the sale of "expiration price options."1081 The SEC is also concerned that the investor understand the "special risks" involved. While the "expiration price options" do
involve a special risk that makes price volatility a major concern in triggering
expiration, the SEC's position could be analogous in the case of regular
options.
For regular options the prime objective should be to insure that the
investor understands the nature of his investment-that is, the functioning of
the option instrument and risk/return involved. The volatility factor is not
as critical here, since the purchaser will gain as long as he exercises the option
at a profitable point. The option writer cannot be expected to perform the
buyer's research and assessment. Therefore, the most useful form of "prospectus" may be a readable description of the option instrument and factors that
contribute to gain or loss-usable in connection with any optioned security.
As institutions enter the market and volume of options grows, the SEC
may also become interested in the registration of option writing "programs"-perhaps disclosing the volume of writing anticipated, the securities to be
involved, whether options are being written covered or naked, and the
endorsement arrangements to be used.
It is obvious that form S-1 under the Securities Act was not designed with
options in mind. While a departure from the traditional prospectus contents
is indicated, this appears to be worked out on a case-by-case basis with the
SEC. 109

108. "Meaningful disclosure in this respect may well include a requirement to refer to
the market fluctuations in the subject security over an appropriate period of time." Interpretive letter In re Goldman, Sachs & Co., CCH Fa. Sac. L. REP. 178,159 (1971). Goldman,
Sachs had stipulated that its sales would be to "sophisticated institutional investors such as

hedge funds and accounts managed by investment advisory organizations ... [and] sophisticated investors of substantial wealth." Id.
109. See SEC Interpretive letter, supra note 105. The registration most analogous to the
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Should option (or at least call option) registration ever be enforced, the
section 4 (2) exemption issue 10 would be a difficult one. Most options are sold
through put and call dealers who are constantly attempting to match buyers
and sellers. They usually purchase from the seller and sell to the buyer on
the same day after the two sides of the transaction have been lined up. Prior
to the sale, the dealer gives "indications" to each side. Thus, it would be
difficult to ascertain the number of "offerees" involved in each transaction.
Many offers are teletyped each day to brokerage houses nationwide. In a
sense therefore, it would be analogous to using an exchange in an offering,
thereby providing strong evidence that an offering is public. 1,1
The question would arise whether options on different securities are themselves different securities for purposes of this exemption and also whether
options on one security written over time should be viewed together. The
issue seems academic, since there is no indication that the SEC will change
its forty-year policy of not enforcing registration. This leaves open the question of potential section 12 (1) liability" 2 for a writer who cannot prove a
section 4 (2) exemption. A strong defense to that suit could be made, however,
by invoking the definition of security under section 2 (1) and the SEC nonenforcement policy. That is, the non-enforcement policy would seem to be
good evidence that the case of options comes within the "unless the context
3
otherwise requires" proviso in the definition, for purposes of section 5."
Insider Trading
Much of the relevance of section 16 of the Exchange Act" 4 depends upon
the status of options as "equity securities" or upon option transactions being
deemed transactions in the underlying shares. Section 3(a)(11) defines
"equity security" as:"'1
[A]ny stock or similar security; or any security convertible, with or
without consideration, into such a security; or carrying any warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase such a security; or any such warrant or
right; or any other security which the Commission shall deem to be of
similar nature and consider necessary or appropriate, by such rules and
regulations as it may prescribe in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to treat as an equity security.
Section 16 (a) requires a corporate insider to file a statement of the amount
of all equity securities in his corporation of which he is the beneficial owner
option case occurred where warrants in a corporation's stock are issued by controlling stockholders simultaneously with a corporate issue. See SEC Sec. Act Release No. 4936 (Guides
for Preparation and Filing of Reg. Sts.), Item 10 (1968); SEC Sec. Act. Release No. 3210 (1947).

110. 15 U.S.C. §77d(2) (1970).
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See Loss, supra note 103, at 655.
15 U.S.C. §771(1) (1970).
15 U.S.C. §78e (1970).
15 U.S.C. §7 8 p (1970).
15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(11) (1970).
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and to report monthly any changes in such ownership. The SEC has long
had rule 16a-6 (originally rule 16a-l(h)) that includes in the reporting
requirement the "acquisition or disposition of any transferable option, put,
call, spread or straddle." 116 The inclusion of options was, however, based on
their being deemed a change in beneficial ownership of the optioned security
rather than "equity securities" themselves. This distinction was made clear
in circulating the proposed rule for comment, 17 and leaves open the question
of section 16 (b) liability.
Rule 16a-6118 has recently been amended to broaden its applicability to
insider option transactions." 9 The rule now covers the "granting" of options
as well as their acquisition and disposition. Also the "transferable" requirement was dropped and a "presently exercisable" requirement added-zo thereby
allowing the postponement of reporting until the option becomes exercisable.
The addition of option writing to the reporting requirement will at least
give publicity to reaping short-term profits from insider information without
section 16 (b) liability even if options are treated as equity securities. The
possibilities for abuse are discussed below.
Rule 16-6 (b) 121 specifies that both the grantor and the holder of an option
are to be deemed beneficial owners of the optioned securities for reporting
purposes. Exercise as well as expiration must be reported by both as a change
in beneficial ownership. Rule 16a-6 (c) exempts from reporting requirements
non-transferable stock options granted pursuant to a corporate stock option
plan meeting the requirements of rule 16b-3.122
The amended rule 16a-6 continues to cover options on the basis of their
constituting beneficial ownership of the optioned stock. The SEC position is
that "whether liability under section 16 (b) will arise from such transactions
is to be determined on the basis of the facts in each particular case in an
2
appropriate action brought by the issuer or its security holders."' 2
The application of section 16 (b) to option transactions can present some
perplexing questions. The various techniques employing options of which
insiders can make use have been fully described elsewhere.' These include
the purchase and subsequent sale or exercise of options and the purchase or

116. SEC Sec. Ex. Act Release No. 4754 (1952).
117. See Loss, supra note 103, at 3044.
118. 17 C.F.R. §240.16a-6 (1972).
119. See SEC Sec. Ex. Act Release No. 9499 (Feb. 23, 1972).
120. Rule 16a-6(a) now reads: "The granting, acquisition or disposition of any presently
exercisable put, call, option or other right or obligation to buy securities from, or sell securities to, another person, or any expiration or cancellation thereof, shall be deemed to
effect such a change in the beneficial ownership of the securities to which the right or obligation relates as to require the filing of a statement pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Act
reflecting such change in beneficial ownership." 37 Fed. Reg. 4330 (1972).
121. 37 Fed. Reg. 4330 (1972).
122. 17 C..R. §240.16 b-3 (1972).
123. Id. at 2.
124. See Comment, Put and Call Options Under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange

Act, 69 YAm Tj.868 (1960).
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sale of the stock followed by "profit-freezing" option transactions designed to
avoid coming within the six-month statutory period. Put and call transactions
have not often been the subject of section 16 (b) litigation, 125 and the issue
of options constituting equity securities has never been decided.
In Silverman v. Landa12 6 a director of Fruehauf Trailer Co. had sold five
straps on Fruehauf stock (10 calls and 5 puts). The plaintiff alleged that as
to an equal number of puts and calls, the calls constituted a "sale" of Fruehauf stock and the puts constituted a "purchase," since the writer's obligation
to sell and buy were irrevocably fixed. The court rejected this approach,
emphasizing the fact that the rights as well as the obligations of the optionor
must be fixed in order to so construe the transactions. The possibility of
non-exercise left open the question of whether a change in stock ownership
would occur. Straddle premiums were thus held not to be recoverable upon
writing the straddle.
The decision seems correct, since at the time of writing a straddle the
writer's profit has not been finally established. Section 16 (b) does include a
profit "realization" requirement. If the straddle was written uncovered and a
large price move (up or down or both) occurred, the loss on performing on
the exercised part of the straddle would more than offset the premium received. Landa owned 2,000 shares of Fruehauf; thus his position was covered.
However, a large price decline would leave the covered writer at a loss on the
exercise of the put.
Treating the straddle premium as representing an automatic short swing
profit to the insider-writer would be quite artificial and unduly harsh. For the
purposes of the statute, a "sale" includes a "contract to sell" 12 -, and a "purchase" includes a "contract to purchase.' 28 Although options are commonly
referred to as contracts, they are more correctly irrevocable offers to enter a
unilateral contract." 29 The premium received is in consideration for the
writer's promise to buy or sell at a certain price. The option buyer is under
no obligation.
Relying on Silverman v. Landa, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has recently ruled that the granting of an option to buy is not a
"sale" for purposes of section 16(b). Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp.'3" grew out of Occidental's unsucccessful attempt to take over Kern
County Land Company in 1967. Occidental's tender (at $85) brought them
887,549 Kern County shares over the period May 9-June 8. To avoid the
takeover, Kern County arranged a one-for-one exchange of Kern County shares

125. The SEC Report found no evidence of insider option transactions in June 1959.
See SEC REPORT, supra note 26, at 75.

126. 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962).
127. Securities Exchange Act §3 (a)(14), 15 U.S.C. §78c (a) (14) (1970).
128.

Id. §3(a)(13), 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(13).

129. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§24A (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964). See gen-

erally Comment, supra note 124, at 884.
130. 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. granted sub nom., Kern County Land Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 405 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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for convertible preferred stock of Tenneco Corporation. The plan was announced on May 19 and the dosing held August 30. All parties wished to
avoid the end result of Occidental becoming a large minority shareholder of
Tenneco, so on June 2 Occidental gave Tenneco an assignable option to
purchase (at $105) the Tenneco shares it would receive in exchange for its
Kern County shares, taking a 10 per cent forfeitable downpayment. Since
Occidental owned over 10 per cent of Kern County, it had become an
"insider" and wished to avoid section 16 (b) liability. It was provided, therefore, that the option not be exercisable before December 9-six months and
one day after Occidental's last purchase of Kern County shares. In order for
Tenneco to obtain a tax-free ruling on its exchange, it was necessary to rid
itself of the option-and so it was sold to Loeb, Rhoades &Co. On December 11
Occidental tendered its Kern County stock, and Loeb, Rhoades exercised its
option.
Kern County, now a Tenneco subsidiary, immediately sued under section
16 (b) arguing that the grant of the option constituted a sale of the stock
within the statutory period. (Plaintiffs alternatively argued that a sale occurred
on August 30 when Occidental became irrevocably entitled to Tenneco
stock.) The court held that the grant of a bona fide option does not constitute a sale for section 16 (b) purposes. The court was aware of the different
market exposures represented by calls as opposed to puts, saying, per
Friendly, J.:131
[A] court may sometimes find a "purchase" or "sale" in a transaction
that would not ordinarily be regarded as one. Although we do not
decide the point, appellees' argument might indeed have force if
Occidental had acquired a "put," exercisable six months and one day
after its last purchase, rather than having submitted itself to a "call."
But the two situations are quite different.
Certiorari has been granted by the Supreme Courts 2 to decide in part if
the sale of an option by an insider with respect to 20 per cent of a class of
securities within a month after purchase of the securities constitutes a "sale"
for purposes of section 16 (b). The option involved is analogous to OTC
options except that it was not exercisable for six months and the premium
was applicable against the purchase price. Therefore, it would follow that if
the Supreme Court held this call option to constitute a sale, OTC calls would
probably also be so treated.

131. Id. at 165.
132. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 405 US. 1064 (1972). On
May 17, 1973, as this article went to print, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
this case. See 41 U.S.L.W. 4582 (May 8, 1973). Departing from the usual bright line test
used in §16(b) cases, the Court made an ad hoc analysis and decided that in the particular
circumstances of this case the call option involved did not constitute the "sale" of a security.
Thus, the decision is limited to those particuar facts.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1973

23

Florida
Review,LAW
Vol. 25,
Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 1[Vol.
REVIEW
OFLaw
FLORIDA
UNIVERSITY

XXV

The writing of options of over six months duration does not offer the
prospects for short swing profits as envisoned by the statute. The six-month
period was picked because of a belief that after that time factors other than
the particular information known to the insider in making his transaction
will be influencing the market price of a security. Therefore an insider writing
an option of over six months duration may not have any certainty of reaping gains.
Finding no section 16 (b) liability upon the writing of straddles does not
adequately resolve the basic issue of the treatment of premiums received in
writing options. This appears to be the one method of using inside information for short swing profits that successfully escapes liability. Even if the
profit potential is not as great as with transactions in the underlying stock
or the purchase of options, 133 the freedom of option writing from section
16 (b) liability may make it an attractive alternative. If the insider's information indicated a market decline, he could write calls (covered or uncovered)
and profit by the amount of the premiums upon their expiration unexercised.
Similarly, for an expected market price increase, puts could be written. In
each case, no matching transaction could be found for the original sale of
the option. It would be difficult to construe the expiration of an option as a
sale or purchase of either the option or the optioned stock.
It seems quite conceivable that an insider intent upon making market
use of his inside information in a safe manner could undertake a program
of regularly writing 30, 60, or 90 day puts or calls depending on the expected
short-term price change. The newly amended rule 16a-6 may deter this to a
degree, since the writing of options will now receive the same publicity as
other section 16 (a) disclosures. The short durations available for options,
and the potential "safe" abuse possible, lay a foundation for the prohibition 134 of insider writing of options of less than six months duration in the
stock of their corporation should this technique come into fashion in the
developing option market.
The question of options constituting "equity securities" was raised in
Miller v. General Outdoor Advertising Co. 35 The case involved a privately
negotiated "Agreement of Put and Call" rather than an OTC option. Under
the agreement, Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. acquired a call on a minimum of
1,500,000 and maximum of 2,000,000 shares of Alleghany Corp. at $10 from
John D. Murchison and C. W. Murchison, Jr. The Murchisons in turn

133. The returns to writing naked options can be considerable, especially if the writer
is confident in his market price outlook. For example, on a $50 stock the insider can put
up a 30% margin ($1,500) and receive a $400 premium for a 60-day call. If the stock declines as expected and the option is not exercised, the premium represents a 26% return in
two months-a huge annual return if done repeatedly based upon the current outlook.
134. The SEC takes the position that §16(b) was not designed to be the sole prohibition
absent fraud or deceit against insider trading and that the legislative history of the Exchange
Act indicates that the Commission's power to define manipulative and deceptive devices indudes the power to prohibit a wide range of abuses in the area of insider trading. See, e.g.,
Brief for SEC, Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. SEC, U.S. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 71-327 (Nov. 1971).
135. 223 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 337 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
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acquired a put on a like number of shares at $10 from Gamble-Skogmo.
These options were extended in time, and shortly after one extension GambleSkogmo contracted to sell 1,600,000 shares to a third party at $10.50. The
plaintiff argued that the extension of the agreement was a "purchase" of an
equity security of Alleghany to be matched with the contract to sell, establishing section 16 (b) liability.
The lower court granted Gamble-Skogmo's motion for summary judgment
on the ground that if there were a purchase, it was not of an equity security
of Alleghany. Foregoing reliance on the literal language of the statutory
definition, the court focused on the words "warrant and right" saying: 186
Warrants and rights have certain specific characteristics important to
the present problem: (1) they are issued by the corporation, (2) they
are negotiable, and (3) they are traded as securities.
The "agreement of put and call" with which we are concerned
has none of these characteristics. It is not issued by Alleghany but by
Murchison.... It is not negotiable or transferable; there is a provision
against transfer. It cannot be traded as a security on an exchange or
any place else; this follows from its non-negotiable character and also
from the fact that it is one of a kind.
The decision has properly been criticized,137 and the granting of summary
judgment was subsequently overruled. 138 The appellate court wisely saw
13
that: ,
Since this is the first case to raise the difficult and far-reaching question
whether the acquisition of a call may be a "purchase" of an "equity
security" under Section 16(b), it falls within that twilight zone where
full development of the facts is necessary to decide whether the transactions involved were susceptible to the type of speculation the section
seeks to eliminate.
As with the definition of "security" it is rather easy to include a call within
the definition of "equity security" as a "right to purchase." For a put, however, it seems more difficult to read it into the definition, since it would have
to constitute a "stock or similar security." Although it seems appropriate to
treat a put as an "instrument commonly known as a security" for section
3 (a) (10), it is less obviously "similar to" a stock for section 3 (a) (Il).Under section 3 (a) (11), however, the SEC has the power to include by rule
a similar security it considers appropriate to treat as an equity security. A
final problem rests in dealing with the phrase "[equity security] of such
issuer" in section 16 (b), since the options involved are not issued by the

136. 223 F. Supp. at 795.
137. See Michaely & Lee, Put and Call Options: Criteria for Applicability of Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 40 NoTmE DAME LAw. 239, 246 (1965).
138. Miller v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 337 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
139. Id. at 948 (emphasis added).

140. 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(11) (1970).
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corporation. Although the lower court in Miller was troubled by this problem,
both the SEC' 41 and various commentators 14 2 are of the view that "of" can
easily be read as "pertaining to" rather than "issued by."
Given the developments in the option market, the recent concern over
regulating other aspects of options,143 the position of the SEC,14 4 and the
general agreement among commentators, it appears quite likely that should
another court be faced with the question, 145 it would at least find calls to
constitute equity securities. Should there be hesitation to include puts, the
SEC's rulemaking power under section 3 (a) (11) could fill the gap.
Section 16 (c) of the Exchange Act prohibits insiders from making "short
sales" or "sales against the box" of equity securities of their company. This
outright prohibition indicates that the congressional purpose behind section
16 (c) went beyond the purpose behind the regulation of short sales generally
pursuant to section 10 (a).1-16 That purpose could well have been to avoid
having insiders profit from price declines in their corporation's securities.
This result can be achieved through buying puts and selling calls as well as
through short sales. This poses the question of treating these transactions as
short sales for section 16 (c) purposes.
A distinction does exist because of the specific fears motivating section
10 (a) short sales regulation. The acquisition of a put does not add to the
selling pressure in the underlying stock, and the exercise of the put will occur
before a specific date rather than await the market bottom as with a short
sale. Similarly the sale of a call exerts no downward pressure, but unlike a
short sale there is no potential purchase if the market price falls.
The profit potential in the put purchase would be eliminated if options
were held to be equity securities, since the reaping of the put profit would
necessitate either the sale of the put or the purchase and sale of the stock if
the put is exercised. As to puts, then, the purposes of section 16 (c) seem to be
accomplished without the necessity of exposing the insider to possible criminal penalties.147 Also, the insider may have legitimate "insurance" uses of
puts that involve no short-swing profits.
Since the writing of calls escapes section 16 (b) liability, there may be
more reason to treat it as a short sale.148 The argument was made in Silver-

141. See Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 6 n.5, Miller v. General Outdoor Advertising
Co., 337 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
142. See, e.g., Michaely & Lee, supra note 137, at 248; Comment, supra note 124, at 874.
143. E.g., margin requirements and rule 16a-6 requirements discussed above.
144. See, e.g., SEC Brief, supra note 141, at 6 n.5.
145. After summary judgment was reversed in the Miller case, the case was settled. The
amount of potential §16(b) liability appears to have been $800,000 (1,600,000 shares at $0.50
per share).
146. 15 U.S.C. §78j(a) (1970).
147. Short selling is made "unlawful" under §16(c) bringing into play the penalties under
§32. The British Companies Act 1967 prohibits a director buying both puts and calls in his
company. 15 & 16 Eliz 2, c. 81, §25.
148. The staff of the Federal Reserve Board is currently considering the question of
whether the sale of a call ought to constitute a short sale for margin purposes. See letter,
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man v. Landa as to the "extra call" in each strap written. However, the SEC
14 9
took a contrary position, and the court rejected the argument, saying:'
Apparently, the plaintiff argues that a call-option presents the same
dangers of insider manipulation as sales short or against the box. Here
again our holding that a call-option is not a sale of the underlying
security demolishes the plaintiff's contention. But that apart, a calloption does not violate §16 (c). For it falls within the proviso that
"no person shall be deemed to have violated this subsection if he
proves that notwithstanding the exercise of good faith he was unable
to make such delivery within (twenty days)"; obviously one who
issues a call-option cannot deliver the underlying security until called
on to do so.
The court's concern about possible abuses was eased by the presence of
the SEC's rulemaking power as to options.
Antifraud and Civil Liability Provisions
While a general discussion of these provisions is beyond the scope of this
article, mention should be made of the sections brought into play by options
constituting "securities." Section 17 of the Securities Act' 50 and section
15 (c) (1) 151 and rule lOb-5 under the Exchange Act 52 can be invoked by the
Commission in injunctive, administrative, or criminal proceedings arising
out of fraud or deceit in connection with option transactions. The latter two
will support implied private actions. Each has its own elements, 15 but the
application of each to the option case should not present particular difficulties.
Bowman v. Hartig154 is a recent case in which the plaintiff attempted to rely
upon section 17 and rule lOb-5 in connection with option transactions. The
plaintiff had opened an option writing account and suffered substantial losses.
His complaint alleged in part: that his broker had (1) falsely represented that
his primary interest was to make profits for the plaintiff whereas it was in
fact to make commissions for himself, (2) induced the plaintiff to write options
on securities of a company without disclosing that the broker was already
committed to dispose of options in those securities, and (8) represented that
the plaintiff could make substantial profits without extraordinary risks. The
court dismissed the first and last as, respectively, "the common puff of a
salesman" and "the common plaint of any loser."''
Since the second was a
claim of non-disclosure tantamount to fraud, it was dismissed with leave to
amend as not pleaded with particularity.

supra note 78.
149. 306 F.2d 422, 425 (2d Cir. 1962).

150. 15 U.S.C. §77g (1970).
151. 15 U.S.C. §78o(c)(1) (1970).
152. 17 C.F.R. §240.106-5 (1972).
153.

See generally Loss, supra note 103, ch. 9A.

154. 334 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
155. Id. at 1328.
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As other bases for civil liability, a plaintiff could look to section 12 (2)
of the Securities Act56 to sue his seller in the case of misstatement or omission
of a material fact. As discussed above, a plaintiff could attempt to recover
under section 12 (1), but it appears that a good defense could be raised.
Section 16 (b) has been discussed above also. Since the SEC has issued no rules
under section 9 (b) or (c), section 9 (e) will give rise to no liability unless the
7
transaction falls within section 9 (a).1
The straightforward nature of the option transaction and probable sophistication of most option purchasers no doubt accounts for the absence of fraud
or deceit actions in this area. The option forms are standardized, and generally no representations are made between the buyer and seller. Therefore,
it seems that the area most ripe for fraudulent or deceptive activity is in the
buyer's or seller's relationship with his broker as in the Bowman case."58
The potentially fraudulent aspects of options appear most acute with
specially negotiated options such as "expiration price options." The "expiration price option" is not the only form of privately placed option that would
require careful disclosure to the purchaser. Other special option forms include
special options with repurchase agreements' 59 and "points up" special
options.161 The unique terms and special risks involved pose difficult questions
of adequate disclosure.
New York Stock Exchange Rules
Aside from the margin rules previously discussed, a number of other rules
of the NYSE pertain to option trading. Rule 77 (5) prohibits the sale or purchase of privileges to receive or deliver securities on the floor of the exchange.
Rule 96 prohibits a member while on the exchange floor from initiating the
purchase or sale (for his own account or an account in which he is interested)
of any stock on which he or his member organization holds or has granted any
option.
Rule 102 prohibits odd lot dealers from holding or granting options in
any stock in which they are registered. Rule 105 similarly prohibits a specialist
from holding or granting options in a stock in which he is a specialist.
156. 15 U.S.C. §77(2) (1970).
157. The absence of rules under §9(b) and (c) does not preclude a §9(a) violation when
options are involved in a transaction. See Harold T. White (White, Weld 8&Co.), 3 S.E.C.
466, 535-37 (1938). Section 9(b) cannot be the basis of implied civil liability. Wolfson v. Park91,967, 96,294 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
way Management Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
158. See discussion of the "know your customer" rule in text accompanying notes 161-164
infra.
159. With an 11% premium on a six-month special call, for example, the writer could
agree to refund 5/11 of the premium after two months. This compensates the holder for the
unused portion of the option period and terminates the obligation of the writer. The accelerated capital turnover can mean higher returns for both the writer and purchaser. See
Snyder, supra note 60, at 97.
160. "Points up" options allow the writer willing to assume greater risk to rely more
heavily on his own market judgment writing, for example, calls on a $100 stock exercisable
at $115 and expiring at $90. See Snyder, supra note 60, at 98.
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Rule 424 is a general requirement for reporting substantial option positions,
but puts and calls are excluded from the rule. Finally, rule 473 covers sales
literature and market letters. The Exchange's guideposts under the rule include
disclosure of option positions in any recommended security. Although probably written with company-issued options in mind, the purpose of the requirement would seem to encompass put and call positions also.
Another rule that seems especially pertinent to options is rule 405-the
"know your customer" rule. The complexity of option transactions and speculative nature of option purchases make options a prime example of an
investment that must be matched to the individual customer's sophistication,
risk averseness, and volume of investible funds. The rule will be particularly
important to investors led into options, since exchange rules that serve the
statutory purposes of the Exchange Act and are designed to protect investors
are an integral part of the SEC's regulatory scheme and may support an im161
plied private right of action against the violator.
The Exchange's "know your customer" rules and the developing suitability
doctrine 162 should play a large part in preventing broker fraud in the option
area. The SEC has indicated that where securities are unregistered, this may
"increase [the broker's] responsibilities, since neither he nor his customers
receive the protection which registration under the Securities Act is designed
to provide."'163 Since OTC options require the endorsement of a NYSE member
firm, the NYSE rules in this area are particularly pertinent. The NYSE has not,
however, dearly recognized suitability as a standard of conduct. Its "know
your customer" rule is more designed to protect member firms against unethical actions on the part of customers. It is to be expected that these rules
64
may breathe new life with the coming restructuring of the securities market.1
Conclusions
It is often necessary to poke and stretch the statutes in order to bring
ordinary put and call trading within the regulatory scheme. Obviously the
statutory definitions could be more precise so that it would be dear that
options (puts and calls) are both securities and equity securities. Although
options do lend themselves to abuses of margin requirements and insider short
swing profit prohibitions, the purchase or sale of ordinary OTC options does
not appear in itself to provide much occasion for fraudulent or deceptive
activity, apart from the actual use of inside information. 165 For the same

161. See Buttrey v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1969).
See generally Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 CoLuM.
L. REv. 12 (1966); Note, 44 TuLANiE L. Ray. 633 (1970).
162. See generally Loss, supra note 103, at 3708-27.
163. SEC Sec. Act. Release No. 4445, at 4 (1962).
164. See text accompanying notes 196-201 infra.
165. Calls were purchased by many of the insiders involved in the Texas Gulf Sulphur
case. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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reasons that the seller ordinarily makes no representations to the buyer outside of the option agreement and that the buyer's need for information as to
the underlying security cannot conveniently or adequately be supplied by the
option seller, registration of options would not serve a necessary purpose.
(The SEC may, for monitoring purposes, desire some sort of registration of
large volume option writing programs.) This rationale would also apply even
when unregistered securities are optioned.
A workable regulatory pattern for options, then, need not include a registration requirement, but ought to make clear that options are included within
antifraud and civil liability provisions. The SEC rulemaking power concerning options could be broadened and made more direct, since now it extends
directly only to transactions in which use of the facilities of a national securities exchange is made or circuitously through the endorsement mechanism.
The major investor protection potential lies in the educational efforts of
the industry1 66 in familiarizing investors with the risks and advantages of
options167 and in remedies based on the "know your customer" rules of the
exchanges and security dealer associations and on the suitability doctrine.
THE CHICAGO BOARD OPTIONs EXCHANGE

The new Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) is designed to correct
the several imperfections of the current option market that were enumerated
above. The central concept involved is the application of commodity futures
market principles to trading in stock options.
The Chicago Board of Trade has certainly had vast experience with futures
trading and feels that many of the commodity techniques can streamline the
option business. The Board of Trade has established the CBOE as a separate
securities exchange in adjacent facilities. A considerable overlap in membership is expected, 6s Trading will be by public auction through a system of
"floor brokers," "board brokers," and "market makers."1 69 While trading will
initially be restricted to calls on sixteen listed stocks, it is contemplated that
more stocks will be added as experience is gained. Trading is expected to
begin in mid-1973.
Standardization of the option contract is the prime prerequisite to futures

166. The limited educational efforts of the Put and Call Brokers & Dealers Association
has been criticized. See Pacey, supra note 29, at 19.
167. The potential for misleading representations of the risks and rewards in option
trading is very evident to the SEC. See SEC Inv.Advisors Act Release No. 228 (Aug. 30, 1968).
As to the promotional material of Stanford Investment Management, the SEC said: "We
find that the over-all effect of the brochure was to give a misleading impression of the
probability of gains to be achieved in the selling of options under Stanford's guidance and
of the unlikelihood of losses, and that its use was contrary to the standards of the [Investment Advisors] Act." Id. at 9. Stanford was censured even though the SEC acknowledged that
their brochure "was patterned in large part upon existing publications relating to options."

Id.
168. See Chicago Board of Trade, Introducing: Chicago Board Options Exchange 3 (1971).
169. See Chicago Board of Trade, Doing Business on the Floor: An Introduction (1971).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss3/1

30

Gates: The Developing Option Market: Regulatory Issues and New Investor
1973]

THE DEVELOPING OPTION MARKET

trading, and to accomplish this the CBOE has reduced the number of option
variables to one-the premium. Thus, the present scattered expiration dates
will give way to established delivery dates, foreseen to be the fifth trading
day before the end of January, April, July, and October. Thus, depending
upon when a buyer or seller enters the market, he may be facing 30, 120, 210,
and 300 day contracts, or alternatively, 90, 180, 270, and 360 day contracts.
The availability of the longest contract would depend upon when each new
delivery month was introduced, that is, whether three or four delivery dates
would be kept "on the board."
Standardization of the striking price poses problems, especially in the more
volatile issues. It is contemplated to introduce a contract at each maturity at
a striking price approximately equal to the current price of the shares. For
example, a $46 stock might be introduced at a striking price of $45. Trading
in options at that striking price would continue until the delivery date.If the underlying stock price varied significantly from the original striking
price, a new contract would be introduced at regular dollar intervals and
trade simultaneously with the original contract. For stocks selling above $50,
a contract would be added at $10 intervals. For stocks under $50, a $5 interval
would be used. This approach is expected to result in six to eight different
option contracts being open at various times in each stock. While this might
seem unwieldy and might present the threat of illiquidity in the older contracts, Chicago Board of Trade members have considerable experience at
"spreading"-a form of arbitrage between delivery months-that should keep
prices in line and liquidity up in all contracts.
The liquid market should make trading in listed options much like that
in listed warrants, so that price movement would occur in conjunction with
that of the underlying stock. Whereas OTC options have little resale value
above their "in the money" value, CBOE options should at all times reflect
the time value of the remaining life of the option. Thus, on resale the option
should bring its "in the money" value plus some consideration for its remaining life. Also, options at striking prices above the current market should
retain this time value.
The CBOE expects to solve the primary shortcomings of the present option
market as follows:
(1). Lower transaction costs. Dealer spreads would be replaced by
a commission system. 7 1 Thus, premiums should fall somewhere in be-

170. No adjustment will be made for dividends on the underlying stock as with OTC
options. The adjustment will then be made in the premium bid.
171. The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department has recently notified the SEC that
approval of fixed commission rates for the CBOE is "plainly contrary to the broad public
interest in a competitive economy" and that fixed rates would appear to violate the antitrust
laws. As authority, the Justice Department cited Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373
US. 341 (1963), and the trend toward elimination of fixed commission rates in the entire
securities industry. Additionally, suit has already been filed against the Chicago Board of
Trade charging violations of 91 of the Sherman Act for the establishment of minimum
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tween the previous dealer's bid and asked prices, and each side will pay a
commission. Savings will result also in liquidating a position since the two
broker's commissions will be avoided.
(2). Greater liquidity. CBOE hopes to attract considerable volume
due to lowered costs, simplified procedures, immediate executions, and the
availability of secondary trading. This will be promoted by greater educational efforts.
(3). Secondary trading. As with commodity futures contracts, the
CBOE will sever the connection between buyer and seller. The CBOE's
clearing house will take the opposite side of each trade. Since each time
a seller sells a buyer buys (and vice versa), the balance continues over
changes in the "open interest." A seller of a call will be able to liquidate
his position (end his obligation) by simply buying an identical call. It is
expected that as with commodity trading only a small percentage of the
contracts will result in actual delivery. This ready resale market will be a
primary attraction of the new exchange.
(4). Greater understanding of options. Bringing option trading "into
the open" should further public and professional understanding of the
transactions.
After successfully introducing call options, the CBOE hopes to begin put
trading on a similar basis. Thus, the ultimate development will be a liquid,
low cost, central market for puts and calls on a wide range of securities.
CBOE

OPTIONS: INVESTOR INTEREST

The growing understanding among private investors and professional money
managers of the nature of option transactions and the risks and rewards they
offer is resulting in greater activity in the option market. The advantages
offered by the CBOE can only accelerate this growing interest. For many
smaller investors it will mean being able to do what was possible before-only
quicker, cheaper, and with less trouble-with the added feature of resalability.
For institutions, however, it may mean access to strategies that to date have
17 2
been impractical due to the market's thinness and illiquidity.
Option Transactions and Institutional Investors
Portfolio Performance. The injection of option writing activity into an
institution's portfolio operation may take one of three forms. First, the
institution may want to undertake a formal option writing program on a large

scale. Second, option writing might be viewed as a supplementary tool in
portfolio management to be used on a more ad hoc basis when it appears
attractive. Third, a specific portion of the portfolio might be turned over to
a professionally-run option writing discretionary account.

commission rates on commodity future contracts. See BNA, SEc. RaG. & L. REP. No. 186,

A-S-A-7 (Jan. 24, 1973).
172. See generally NATHAN

REPORT,

supra note 45, at 74; Malkiel & Quandt, supra note
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The formal option writing program is most feasible when a fairly large
volume of funds can be committed to it. Option writers are generally looking
for a steady 20-30 per cent return annually. The operation would resemble
insurance underwriting, since risks will be accepted in exchange for premiums
to be received. The concept will work best when carried out on a widely
diversified basis over a long period of time. Profit or loss on a single transaction
will not be critical. The institution, for that part of its portfolio committed to
the program, is content to trade the market swings for a steadier income
stream.
Position Adjustments. Institutional portfolio management often involves
the advance planning of portfolio adjustments. This is especially true in the
case of insurance companies and pension funds, in which cash inflows and
outflows may occur in large volume at different times. The planning of future
transactions may be facilitated by the use of options. Where funds are to
become available in the future due to a large cash inflow and a portfolio
selection has been made, calls on that stock may be purchased to peg its
purchase price. The premium received for writing a put on the stock would
offset a subsequent price increase before it could be added to the portfolio.
Likewise, where it is known that some stocks will have to be sold to meet
cash outflow needs, calls can be sold to peg the sale price above the current
market or to cushion a decline.
Hedging. An institution's approach to hedging activity in options can
take one of two forms or both. A hedge on a particular stock position might
be sought due to uncertainty as to its future price potential. Also an institution might desire an over-all hedge against an over-all market decline.
Block Trading. The risk in the movement of large block positions may be
eased by the volume available and the secondary market on the CBOE. Block
positioners cannot now find the volume to place a hedge or the liquidity to
lift it. In any block trade it may become necessary for the dealer to position
the block overnight or for several days or a week. This fully exposes the
dealer to the downside risk in the issue. That risk can be fully eliminated
by the purchase of a put and sale of a call on the stock. This attains the riskfree position of an option converter. The premium on the call offsets the cost
of the put. When the block is finally placed, the hedge can be lifted by offsetting option transactions.
Since the CBOE will trade initially only in calls, the dealer will be able
only to half-hedge. The sale and subsequent purchase of calls, however, can
effectively offset part of a price decline on the stock. To illustrate, if a 5,000
share block must be positioned for a week, the dealer would acquire the shares
at, say, $30 per share and immediately sell 50 calls on the stock at $30 for
about $300 each. If the stock price dropped to $25, the dealer will have lost
$25,000 on the stock-but he will be able to buy in his option contract at a
lower price. If options to buy at $30 are now selling for $100 each, he has
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sold $15,000 worth and purchased them at $5,000. This gain of $10,000 partially offsets his loss. The risk has been cut almost in half.
The same approach would apply to taking a large short position to facilitate a block sale. The risk-free position then would be the opposite-buy a call
and sell a put. With only calls available only a half-hedge could be placed.
The example used a 5,000 share block-not a large one by block trading
standards. It will be rare, however, that an entire block would have to be
positioned for long. The position could no doubt be more on the order of
10,000-20,000 shares. Finding options on this volume may be as difficult as
finding buyers for the underlying stock. A hedge on 20,000 shares, for example, would require the sale of 200 calls in one day. For the seller not to
represent more than 10 per cent of the selling pressure, the daily volume
would have to be in excess of 2,000 calls in each security involved. This would
represent a tremendous increase over present option writing activity and is
not to be expected for some time.
Another group that would probably be interested in hedging activity would
be specialists on stock exchanges. As noted before, stock exchange rules currently prohibit specialist transactions in options. This probably resulted from
the frequency with which specialists were involved in "pool" operations before
the federal securities laws were enacted. The prospect of specialist participation in the option market does not present the possibility of similar abuses,
and it is evident that the specialist inventory position is one situation that
lends itself to the classical application of hedging transactions much as are
carried out on the commodity exchanges.
Speculation. Institutional speculation will be facilitated by the anticipated
larger option volume. Hedge funds have for some time employed the leverage
potential of options to capitalize on market movements. In a rising market
the availability of calls will present a strong temptation to any fund manager
whose charter allows such purchases. It is conceivable that a large shift of
buying pressure to the option market could reduce the upward pressure on
the underlying stock. However, as with the commodity markets, the direction
of the relationship between the spot and futures price at any point in time is
unclear. Thus, while buying pressure in the underlying stock is reduced,
buying pressure in the call options can drive up the futures price and to a
degree carry the cash market with it. One great advantage of the CBOE will
be to break the current tight interaction of the two markets, since now option
transactions ending in exercise result in stock market transactions.
The potential of large gains at limited risk cannot help but be attractive
to sophisticated money managers with an optimistic outlook. The market
hedge concept was an original justification of the hedge fund that employed
put and call purchases. Many of these operations are more properly leverage
funds seeking maximum profits from expected price movements. The call
options now sold in large volume are primarily purchased by speculative funds
seeking the high leverage.
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Implementation. Trading on new commodity exchanges tends to be somewhat thin and sporadic until familiarity with the new tool grows with those
it is designed to serve. Since the potentially large users of the CBOE will be
inexperienced in option trading, it is doubtful that option volume will skyrocket over night. In fact it may take considerable time for the CBOE to
reach trading volumes that will totally satisfy large institutional demands.
For example, even if it is assumed that the 1,000 options traded per day
presently were spread over only 100 issues, 10 options per day would be the
average in each issue. For trading volumes to reach 1,000 options per day
per issue, volume would have to grow 100 times.
Institutional option writing programs and position adjustment uses can
employ the technique of spreading transactions over time so that 100 options
could be written on a 10 option per day basis. However, for the block positioner to effectively employ a hedging strategy, he must be able to acquire
and lift the hedge quickly. Thus, while some institutional strategies can be
implemented soon after the CBOE begins trading (assuming trading volume
in each issue reaches 100-200 options per day), others requiring large transactions over a short term will remain difficult until volume grows considerably.
CBOE LEGAL ISSUES

Apart from the regulatory aspects of option trading discussed generally
above, several issues pose particular problems for the CBOE.
Registration
1
Section 5 of the Exchange Act provides:'

3

It shall be unlawful for any broker, dealer, or exchange, directly or
indirectly, to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce for the purpose of using any facility of an exchange within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to
effect any transaction in a security, or to report any such transaction,
unless such exchange (1) is registered as a national securities exchange
under section 6 ....
Since call options are securities under section 3 (a) (10) of the Act, the CBOE
must be registered as a national securities exchange. Section 12 (a) of the
Exchange Act then provides that any security traded on a national securities
exchange must be registered under the Exchange Act.1-

173. 15 U.S.C. §78e (1970).
174. The SEC has recently proposed a new rule 12a-6 to provide an exemption from the
registration provisions of §12(a) of the Exchange Act for securities underlying options where
the option is itself registered on a national securities exchange and the underlying security
is registered and listed on another national securities exchange and the exchange upon which
the option is listed limits its activity in the underlying securities to effecting exercises of
the options. SEC Sec. Ex. Act Release No. 9931 (Jan. 9, 1973). Thus, the CBOE would be

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1973

35

Florida
Law
Review,LAW
Vol. 25,
Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 1[Vol. XXV
OF
FLORIDA
REVIEW
UNIVERSITY
It appears that CBOE call options will have to be registered under the
Securities Act also. This in turn will bring the prospectus requirements into
play. Although registration has never been enforced as to OTC options, it is
evident that the "context may otherwise require." The CBOE, however, will
sever the contractual ties between buyer and seller. Thus, the CBOE's clearing
house will be the "issuer" of the options, and it will be obligated to perform
upon exercise. The context allows registration here, since only one issuer of
standardized options will be involved. The registration of calls sold to the
clearing house presents the same difficulties as with OTC options.
Since the CBOE options can conveniently be registered, this leaves only
the difficulty of formulating a prospectus to be delivered to purchasers. As
described above, the purchaser's primary interest will be in the functions of
the clearing house and the actual contractual obligations and rights embodied
in the option. Whether the CBOE must provide information as to the stock
underlying the option remains an open question with the SEC. One possibility
may be to direct the option purchaser to the location of detailed information
pertaining to the underlying security.
To some degree, concern over the information transmitted by the call
issuer to the purchaser is reduced by the increasingly important suitability
doctrine. A customer's broker should alert him to the risks and rewards of
option trading and assist him in assessing the desirability of a transaction.
Even if the customer forges ahead with a purchase against or without broker
advice, the broker would "appear to be obliged to reveal to the customer
information known to him about the security which might reasonably be
expected to affect the customer's decision, apart from his other duties under
applicable provisions of the securities laws.."'17

Thus, the investor does not need protection so much to insure that what
he is getting is fairly represented as he needs to understand the transaction
and be well counseled as to its advisability.
Margin Requirements
Once options are registered on a national securities exchange, they would
appear to constitute "margin equity securities" within the meaning of Regulation T, section 220.3 (c) (2) .176 A "margin security" under section 220.2 (f)
means any registered security or OTC margin stock. CBOE options would
qualify as registered securities. The term "equity security" for purposes of
Regulation T is defined as in the Exchange Act, section 3 (a) (11).177 Call
options clearly come within that definition, and perhaps put options would

relieved of the need to register the securities underlying its options; this leaves open the
question of the extent to which the SEC will sanction the trading on exchanges of options
on unlisted securities.
175. SEC Statement of the SEC on the Future Structure of the Securities Market, at 38
(Feb. 2, 1972). The SEC appears to favor a central role for the suitability doctrine.
176. Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. §220.3(c)(2) (1971).
177. Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. §220.2(b) n.2 (1971).
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also. Thus, on its face, Regulation T in its current form would allow the
purchase of CBOE call options on margin. A call purchaser on the CBOE
could presently undertake his option position by putting up 65 per cent of
the premium on the call. To the extent that call purchasers are speculators
attracted to calls because of the high leverage, even greater leverage could be
attained. In fact at 65 per cent margin almost twice as many calls could be
purchased by putting up the same funds.
This prospect is currently of some concern to the staff of the Federal
Reserve Board who are formulating recommendations to the Board with a
view to adopting certain changes in Regulation T or, alternatively, issuing
an interpretation concerning the applicability of Regulation T to CBOE
options.178
Three issues are actually involved in the margin question: (1) Should it
be possible to buy registered options on margin? (2) Ought an uncovered
sale of a call option be treated as a short sale requiring the margin deposit
prescribed in section 220.8 (d) of Regulation T? (3) If options on unmarginable OTC stocks were registered on the CBOE, should margin purchases of
them be allowed?
The margined purchase of investment vehicles such as options, initially
involving a high degree of leverage, appears to "double" the prospect for
injecting excessive credit into the securities market. The CBOE, however,
feels that "highly meaningful improvements" in margin treatment can be
attained as compared to OTC options. 7 9 The CBOE is hopeful on this point
no doubt because the extra leverage will attract even more investor interest
and allow the exchange more quickly to reach a trading volume attractive to
institutional investors.
It is frequently argued that the extensive use of credit is not the cause of,
but rather the result of, a speculative climate. The Federal Reserve Board
evidently believes in a close causal connection.15 0 It does seem logical that
the possibility of investment on margin would prompt a willingness on the
part of a speculator to pay somewhat more than he otherwise would have for
a position. If the leverage is great enough the price can be bid up substantially
and still offer attractive returns as compared to unmargined investments.
The precise impact that margin treatment might have on option trading
would be difficult to assess. Commodity futures type trading tends to be
fairly volatile in and of itself. The presence of additional volatility due to
margined purchases may not be detectible. One thing strongly favoring
margin treatment for options is the fact that listed warrants can be purchased
on margin. No particularly disruptive influences have been reported because
of this "double leverage." Like the option, the warrant offers leverage to the

178.

See Letter, supra note 78.

179. Chicago Board of Trade, supra note 168, at 12.
180. In lowering the margin requirement after the 1962 market break, the Board took

into account "the abatement in speculative psychology." See 48
(1962).
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buyer, and in fact it is to be expected that call options will trade much like
listed warrants.
Of course the initial decision on the margin issue is not irreversible, so
that if margined purchases were allowed and proved to generate the overextension of investors' positions, the margin treatment could be changed. The
experience with warrants should lessen any hesitation to at least experiment
with margined purchases. It does not seem likely that a dramatic "spill over"
effect on stock market volatility would occur, and the margin decision is at
any time quickly reversible.
As to the margin treatment to be accorded the selling of naked calls, it
should be noted that significant differences exist between that strategy and
short selling. Both positions profit if the stock price declines, however the call
writer profits only to the extent of the premium he receives. The positions are
essentially the same relative to a stock price increase, since each would involve
buying in at a higher price to cover. On the CBOE the call seller would buy
back his call, whereas the short seller would purchase the stock. Unlike the
short sale the call sale does not exert downward pressure on the underlying
stock price. This factor plus the limited gain in the event of a price decline
lessens any concern over "bear raids" through call sales.
The rationale for establishing a margin requirement for short sales' s ' was
18 2
that the lending of securities was the same as extending monetary credit.
Call sales involve no such lending of securities. Although these facts constitute
the differences between naked call sales and short sales, it must be noted that
NYSE rules treat such options as if exercised for margin purposes'8 3 and thus
25 per cent of the market price of the underlying stock must be deposited on
uncovered puts and 30 per cent on uncovered calls. This requirement is more
to insure the capacity to perform upon exercise of the option than to reflect
a resemblance to short sales. Again, these are the minimum margin requirements-many brokerage houses require more.
There appears, therefore, to be no compelling reason to treat naked call
options as short sales for margin purposes. The solution may be conveniently
reached through a CBOE rule requiring a deposit of funds much like the
deposit required in commodity trading.
The possibility of options on some OTC stocks being registered on the
CBOE presents an anomaly in that it may be possible to buy options on an
OTC issue on margin but not the stock itself. The issue may be academic,
since by the time the CBOE is ready to list options on OTC issues the nation's
security trading may have been centralized in a single market. 8 4 Also, should
the issue arise before then an argument could be made that an option is a
security sui generisy8 5 and a decision on its margin treatment should be made

181. See Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. §220.8(d) (1971).
182. See Comment, Credit Regulation in the Securities Market: An Analysis of Regulation T, 62 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 587, 601 (1967).
183. NYSE Rule 431(d)(2).
184. See SEC Statement, supra note 175, at 7.
185. See Anderson, Chicago Options,27 Bus. LAw. 7, 19 (1971).
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on that basis. The factors that determine the margin treatment of OTC
stocks' s6 are not necessarily applicable to options. It would not be a major
setback should options on unmarginable OTC stocks not be marginable, since
this need only result in a ruling that only those options are unmarginable.
Insider Trading
The previous discussion of insider trading generally remains fully applicable to CBOE options. The fact of registration has no technical bearing on
options constituting "equity securities," however the additional stature that
may be accorded to puts registered on a national securities exchange may
ease any judicial reluctance to hold that puts are "equity securities" for
section 16 (b) purposes.
Antifraud Provisions

As with section 16 (b) liability, the previous discussion of antifraud provisions should remain equally applicable to CBOE options. The SEC's rulemaking power should extend to all aspects of CBOE trading, since it in itself
will be a national securities exchange. The CBOE should prevent potential
for new abuses, and adequate exchange rules can reduce the likelihood of
broker fraud in dealing with option customers.
Since CBOE options will be registered and a prospectus delivered to purchasers, resort to an action under sections 11 or 12(1) becomes possible. These
provisions will in all probability give rise to little litigation, since the registration will be performed by the CBOE clearing house, and a prospectus will
be routinely delivered with each confirmation of sale.
Effect on Stock Market Trading

The precise effect that option trading will have on trading in the underlying securities remains unclear. There are some possible developments that
may promote more volatility and others that may promote less. 8 7 To the
degree that options become more widely used by uninformed speculators
employing the full leverage of option positions, greater volatility in option
prices may become manifest. It is not at all clear that this would translate
into any effect on trading in the underlying stock. A recent study indicated
that the distribution of stock price relatives for optioned and unoptioned
securities is "substantially undistinguishable."11s8 That study did find, however,
that there is some evidence that the price volatility of optioned stocks is
greater than for non-optioned ones. This is certainly understandable and

186. See Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. §220.2(c)(1) (1971).
187. See NATHAN REPORT, supra note 45, at 84.
188. See Quandt & Malkiel, Option Trading, Stock Price Movements, and Investment
Strategies, Memo No. 6, Working Draft, Finandal Research Center, Princeton, at 20 (1970).
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confirms the expectations of market practitioners, since options tend to be
written on more volatile stocks. The study found no support for the theory
that increases in the volume of option activity and option prices are an
indicator of large stock price changes." 9
On the other hand, the availability of an efficient, low cost option market
could divert short-term trading from the underlying stock and decrease stock
price volatility. Although diversion of speculative or other short-term trading
may thus be viewed as stabilizing, to the degree the diversion is large it could
reduce stock market liquidity. Such diversion would have to be massive, however, for this effect to be felt. Also, since it is to be expected that most options
would be written covered, option sales will correspond to established or newlyestablished stock market positions. That the diversion of trading possibility is
not a major concern is supported by the lack of similar impact on warrant
trading where transactions in the underlying shares need never be involved.
While the ultimate impact is not clear, it seems reasonable to expect that, as
with commodity futures markets, the effect on balance will be stabilizing. 190
Exchange Rules
As with the other national securities exchanges, the regulatory scheme will
in large part involve self-regulatory exchange rules. 91: For instance, several
areas particularly appropriate for carefully composed rules have already been
mentioned: margin requirements and the suitability of the option investment.
The CBOE will no doubt adopt deposit requirements for the writing of un-

189. Id. For a theoretical discussion of rational option pricing, see Merton, Theory of
Rational Option Pricing, Working Paper 574-71, Sloan School of Management, M.I.T. (Oct.
1971).
190. On the London Stock Exchange where options are traded on the exchange floor
and are only exercisable at the end of account periods, the influence on stock prices is more
pronounced. One account says: "Declaration time for options when dealings were allowed
was interesting and often exciting. The adjustment of the various option positions on this
day was often reflected in market prices. The people who used options as a medium for
their dealing, and the firms who specialised in them, could be considered shrewd and skillful judges of market developments. Often an inquiry as to why prices in a particular market
were better was answered by the significant remark 'option buying.' Market operators only
.gave' money when they held decisive views, and, therefore, while it was not an infallible
test of which way a particular market was moving, this powerful factor commanded attention,
and led one to admit that frequently 'Options spoke louder than words.'" F. ARMSTRONG, THE
BOOK OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 118 (1957). Commodity futures trading has not necessarily been

stabilizing in every case. Trading in onion futures was prohibited in 1958, see 7 U.S.C.
§13-1 (1970), and similar legislation is now pending as to potatoes. See Wall St. J., April 10,
1972, at 18, col. 2. The argument is that futures trading exaggerates cash price fluctuations.
191. Referring to the "complex problems and special risks" involved in option trading,
the SEC has recently proposed new rule 9b-I under the Exchange Act specifying special
procedures in connection with exchange rules concerning option transactions. SEC Ex. Act
Release No. 9930 (Jan. 9, 1973). As opposed to the procedures under rule 17a-8, the SEC
proposes to review exchange rules pertaining to options prior to their becoming effective.
Furthermore, the SEC would be able by order, after notice and hearing, to require the
adoption or change of any rule concerning option transactions. Id.
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covered options. 92 It may be desirable for "suitability" and "know your customer" rules to take on a new specificity here to insure that the potential
investor has a full appreciation of his transactions and that the desirability
of option trading for him has been fully discussed.
This specificity could take the form of guidelines indicating among other
things, the types of accounts for which option trading would be appropriate,
the proportion of an account that might appropriately be devoted to options,
and directives in the handling of discretionary accounts. 93 As new suitability
rules have been drawn, there has been a trend toward their being more comprehensive and specific. It seems especially appropriate, therefore, that the
CBOE's suitability rule be dearly designed to protect the investor's interestin terms of comprehensiveness, surveillance, and sanctions.
Promotional material relating to the use of the CBOE will no doubt be
drafted with the Stanford Investment Management'" action in mind. This
will require a realistic presentation of the risks and rewards in option trading.
As CBOE trading procedures will be much like commodity futures transactions, the types of trading rules that have developed in the commodity
market might also be very useful. 95 These include such things as periodic
position reports for large volume traders, position limits either in terms of
an absolute limit or a percentage of open interest limit, daily trading limits
on prices, and discretionary trading suspension powers.
The Role of Options in the Future Structure of Securities Markets
In its Statement on the Future Structure of the Securities Markets,981 the
SEC has outlined its view of a single central market place system characterized
by the comprehensive disclosure of transactions and quality of service to the
investor. Chairman Casey has stated that the biggest challenge will be:' 9 '
[T]o adapt the securities markets to growing institutionalization, with
its increased tempo and magnitude of transactions, while maintaining

192. In commodity trading, for example, hedging accounts have more favorable deposit
requirements than non-hedging accounts.
193. The SEC Special Study concluded: "This area would seem to be a particularly
appropriate one to be dealt with through statements of policy [similar to that now applicable
to investment company selling literature], which can provide the necessary balance between
generality and specificity of standards." I SEC SPEciAL STrn OF TnE SE CURry MARxrrs,
H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 329 (1963). Proposed rule 9b-2 under the Exchange
Act would impose disclosure, suitability, and net capital requirements on broker-dealers
doing business in option contracts. See SEC Sec. Ex. Act Release No. 9994 (Feb. 8, 1973).
194. SEC Inv. Adv. Act Release No. 228 (Aug. 30, 1968). See note 167 supra.
195. See 7 U.S.. §1-11 (1971). See generally Wolff, Comparative Federal Regulation of
the Commodities Exchanges and the National Securities Exchanges, 39 GEo. WAsM. L. REV.
223 (1969).
196. See SEC, supra note 175.
197. Statement by William J. Casey, Chairman of the SEC, upon release of the Commission's Policy Statement on the Future Structure of the Securities Markets, at 3 (Feb. 2,
1972).
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the confidence and the participation of the individual investor. This
will require absorbing more and large blocks from institutions without
creating spreads and price gyrations which frighten the small investor
and while maintaining the depth and liquidity which has attracted
investors from all over the world to our markets.
Should the CBOE generate sufficient volume and operate smoothly, it will
certainly come to play an effective role in the future securities market. While
the Institutional Investor Studyl'9 found that on an over-all basis and over
extended periods of time-usually about a month-institutional trading did
not lead to instability in the market, it appears that such instability does
occur in the short run. 199 It has been argued that the lowering of the negotiated
commission rate level would hurt block trading, since the block firm's commission "cushion" would be reduced, and thus raise the risk of loss on blocks
temporarily positioned. This diminution of the ability to handle large blocks
would raise the discounts on these large blocks. The SEC has indicated that
"ways must be found to ensure that these disruptions in the manner in which
securities are priced in the marketplace are minimized, at least to the extent
they are a result of liquidity preferences and not in response to information
generally available to public investors."2 °0 The availability of hedging transactions on the CBOE can effectively reduce the risk in block positioning and
help eliminate this market disruption.
In addition to advancing the cause of block trading and making more
flexible the institutional investment strategies available, the CBOE will bring
option transactions "into the open" and protective exchange rules should
improve the quality of service to the investor.
Furthermore, the CBOE will provide potentially valuable experience with
two currently controversial possible market innovations: abolition of the stock
certificate and institutional membership. As with commodity exchanges, the
CBOE will operate on the basis of one day clearing of transactions, transaction
confirmations to the customer, and monthly position reports to the customer.
No actual certificate will change hands. This alleviation of back office pressures
and consequent reduction in costs should allow the CBOE to operate smoothly
and efficiently. The effectiveness and customer acceptance of the procedures
formulated will be of great help in broadening the practice.
Currently the Chicago Board of Trade has several banks as members. It
has been expected that several institutions may join the CBOE also.201 This
198.

H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 8 (1971).

199. See SEC, supra note 175, at 20.
200. Id. at 21.
201. The prospect of institutional membership has been diminished by the SEC's recent
firm stand against direct institutional membership generally. Chairman Casey's letter to the
registered national securities exchanges (including the CBOE) requested that the exchanges
adopt rules restricting membership to firms doing the predominant portion of their brokerage
business on registered national securities exchanges for non-affiliated customers. See Letter
from William Casey to the Stock Exchanges, Feb. 15, 1972, CCH FFD. SEC. L. REP. 78,529.
Proposed rule 19b-2 would so limit exchange membership. See SEC Sec. Act. Rel. No. 9716
(Aug. 3,1972).
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too can be carefully watched for what light may be shed on the institutional
membership issue generally.
CONCLUSION

The CBOE promises to provide a useful new trading tool for individuals
and institutions alike. Institutions should be especially interested, since a
significant increase in option volume will facilitate new market strategies.
The availability of the new tool should also help solve the block trading
problems associated with the growing institutionalization of the market. A
carefully considered set of CBOE exchange rules, designed to curtail the
possibility of manipulative abuses and to fully protect the option customer,
could greatly advance the "respectability" of option trading. The rules should
include trading abuse protection such as those pertinent to commodity trading
as well as strict "know your customer" and "suitability" rules with appropriate guidelines.
Although the CBOE will take a form iot conducive to its inclusion in a
single central marketplace, it should become a significant side marketinnovations in which will offer valuable precedents to stock market developments.
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